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ABSTRACT
The Congress of the United States, in passing the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, radically altered the benefit stream for all real
estate projects and created a crisis in the real estate
syndication industry. From a peak of more than $10 billion in
1984, the industry's sales collapsed to only $3.6 billion in
1986.
The structure of real estate syndications before and after tax
reform were analyzed. Both conventional garden apartments and
low-income housing syndications were reviewed. The ways
syndicators are structuring and targeting the new limited
partnerships are described.
While prior to tax reform, limited partnerships offered
investors very high returns with little risk, the success of
new syndications depends upon the economic success of the real
estate assets. The annual returns are often unpredictable and
just competitive with less risky alternative investments.
Low-income housing may suffer due to the narrowly defined and
complicated regulations introduced by the new tax laws.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence S. Bacow
Title: Professor of Law and Environmental Policy
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
When McDonald's began offering one free Smurf doll with
the purchase of a McDonald's Happy Meal, an enterprising seven
year-old neighbor of mine, Carol, developed a unique method to
increase her Smurf collection. She found three friends who
each liked a different part of the Happy Meal: hamburger,
Coke, and fries. She then offered to buy each friend's item
at a small discount and deliver it to their homes. Then by
investing a small sum Carol was able to purchase the meal and
get the Smurf at a substantial discount over the price in toy
stores.
REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION DEFINED
Real estate syndications work in much the same way as
Carol's method for acquiring Happy Meals. A rea-l estate
syndication partnership pools money for real estate purposes.
Instead of hamburgers, Cokes, fries, and Smurfs, the partners
2
value elements of the project's benefit stream: cash flow (or
the cash remaining annually after all debt is paid), the tax
benefits (usually taxes losses generated by deducting
depreciation and mortgage interest from the cash flow to
determine the taxes due)1, and the residual (or the value of
the property at sale after all debt is repaid). The three
parties typically involved in syndications (investor,
syndicator, and developer) often value different parts of the
benefit stream differently. Each seeks a different mix of
risk and return not available to each separately. The result
is that the sum of the parts is greater than the whole.
1 Losses offset income in tax calculations.
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TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 AND ITS IMPACT
The syndication industry survived for more than a decade on
generous tax advantages -----------------------------
TOTAL REAL ESTATE
given to real estate. Enormous SYNDICATION INDUSTRY
EN
tax losses were created by a - $10-in billions NE
EN
shortened depreciation period EN
BE
and interest deductions which--8 ME
EN
often went beyond the funds : EN
BE EN EN
invested. When these tax -i6 NE NE NE
BE EN EN
benefits ran out after the : BE EN EN
EN EN EE
first few years, inflation --4 NE NE NE
BE NE E EE
pushed values up high enough : EN EN EN EN EE EN
EN EN E BE BE E :
to produce lucrative returns. --2 NE NE NE NE NE NE NE :
EE EN EN ENE EE BE :
Even after Congress lengthened BE BE BE EN EN EN EN E :
:0 BE EE E BE BE EM BE -
the depreciation period in ------------------------------
YEAR 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
1984, the tax advantages Source: Robert A. Stanger & Co.
remained substantial.
However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA'86) radically
altered the benefit stream for all real estate projects and
created a crisis in the real estate syndication industry. The
diminished value of tax losses, the aspect of the benefit
stream attracting investors, demanded that syndicators and
developers create new structures for syndications to maintain
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the investor's interest. From a peak of more than $10 billion
in 1984, the industry sales collapsed to only $3.6 billion in
1986. (See graph)2 The shakedown most severely affected
companies specializing in the sale of partnership shares to
wealthy individuals seeking tax shelters.
UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGED STRUCTURE OF SYNDICATIONS
This paper will examine changes in the structure of real
estate syndications resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA'86). In the chapters that follow, I will describe and
compare typical syndication deal structures before and after
TRA'86.
This paper has two goals: to describe the new structures
of syndication offerings and to consider the potential impact
of the new tax laws on America's real estate stock.
The offerings analyzed in this paper are similar in two
respects: First, the syndicator and the developer are the same
party. Second,all of the real estate projects represented in
the offerings involve upgrading either garden apartments or
low- income housing. The underlying economic assumptions of
each project will not be evaluated; this paper will focus
2.Albert Scardino,"Real Estate Syndicator's Shift:
Tighter Focus at Winthrop," New York Times, June 25, 1987, p.
Dl.
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solely on the allocation of the benefit stream to the various
partners. All projects are assumed to deliver their proforma
benefit stream.
The remainder of this chapter will further define
syndication through a brief history of the industry and a
discussion of typical partners' interests.
Chapter two describes how the new tax law affects real
estate. The third and fourth chapters analyze the structure
of specific real estate syndications prior to and after
TRA'86, respectively.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SYNDICATION
During the 1950s and 1960s most syndication offerings gave
investors tax shelters through small private placements. The
general partners, often accountants or lawyers, usually
upgraded properties.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the syndication
industry expanded; many major syndicators joined the business
offering larger, more sophisticated public and private
offerings. The Securities and Exchange Commission required
that more detailed information be provided to investors as the
deals became more complex.
6
Limited partnerships were excellent investments throughout
the 1970s. Inflation increasingly caused the value of
properties to rise while the mortgage interest rate remained
relatively low.3 By the end of the 1970s, the real estate
syndication business was booming as investors received not
only tax shelters but economic gains in the form of residuals
and /or cash flow. Limited partnerships often out-performed
alternative investment options, as shown in the table below:
"AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF RETURN FOR VARIOUS INVESTMENT VEHICLES,
--------------------- 1970-1979*4 --------------------- "
" Real Estate Funds 10.3% "
" S&P Stock Index 4.7%
" Salomon Brothers Long Term Corp. Bonds Index 6.6% "
" 90-Day Treasury Bills 6.3% "
"f CPI 7.4% o
"f * all figures adjusted for inflation "
3. Peter C. Aldrich, "Note on Real Estate Syndication,"
Harvard Business School (9-385-152).
4. Aldrich, "R.E. Syndication", HBS.
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A PROTOTYPICAL REAL ESTATE DEAL
A simplified example explains how a typical project
generated its benefit stream prior to TRA'86. Exhibit 11 A
and 11 B shows a property purchased for $10 million. The
developer obtains a 30 year mortgage for $8 million at 10%.
All fees (such as leasing, operating, property management,
etc.) have already been deducted from the net operating income
(as given in the example).
The cash flow, shown on the benefit stream table, results
from deducting the annual mortgage debt service from the net
operating income.
The taxable income is determined by deducting the annual
interest payments and the substantial depreciation allowance
created by the short depreciation period. As shown on the
benefit stream table, tax losses resulted. Higher leveraged
deals created even larger amounts of tax losses. Thes'e losses
could be used to offset income from totally unrelated sources.
Assuming a 50% marginal tax bracket, every $2 of losses offset
$1 of income. Thus, the benefit stream schedule lists the tax
benefits as 50% of the amount of losses.
Sales proceeds constitute the final element of the benefit
stream. Besides repaying the mortgage, the parties must pay
taxes upon sale. The capital gains tax allowed the property
8
EXHIBIT 11 Megan M. Dobroth
PRE-TAX REFORM '86 * (Assuses a 50% sarginal tax bracket)
PURCHASE PRICE 10,000,000
MORT6AGE AMOUNT 8,000,000
INTEREST RATE 10.002
TERM 30
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE) 19
HOLDING PERIOD 7
SALES PRICE 12,000,000
CASH FLOW 1 2 3 4 5 6
NET OPERATING INCOME 850,000 850,000 890,000 895,000 900,000 901,000
LESS: ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE (845,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633)
CASH FLOW BEFORE TAXES 1,367 1,367 41,367 46,367 51,367 52,367
TAXABLE INCOME
NET OPERATING INCOME 850,000 850,000 890,000 895,000 900,000 901,000
LESS: INTEREST (800,000) (795,136) (789,786) (783,902) (777,428) (770,308)
LESS.: DEPRECIATION (4213, V") f431,053) (421,053) (421,053) (421,053) (421,053)
REAL ESTATE AXABLE INCOME (371,053) (366,9) (320,839) (309,955) (298,481) (290,361)
ADJUSTED BASIS CALCULATION OF GAIN
ORIGINAL BASIS 10,000,000 SALES PRICE 12,000,000
LESS.:DEPRECIATION (2,947,368) LESS: ADJUSTED BASIS (7,052,632)
ADJUSTED BASIS 7,052,632 GAIN 4,947,368
AMOUNT OF GAIN TAXED (401) 1,978,947
TAX LIABILITY ON SALE * 9e9,474
SALE PROCEEDS
SALES PRICE 12,000,000
LESS: MDRTGASE (7,523,601)
LEES: TAX L:AB:LITY CN SALE* (985,474)
PE=7EES ATTER TAXIES 3,426,92!
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PRE-TAX REFORM
BENEFIT STREAM
ANNUAL
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX
INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUT CURRENT
YEAR (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLOW RETURN
1 (371,053) 185,526 1,367 186,893
2 (366,189) 183,094 1,367 184,461
3 (320,839) 160,419 41,367 201,786
4 (309,955) 154,977 46,367 201,344
5 (298,481) 149,240 51,367 200,607
6 (290,361) 145,180 52,367 197,547
7 (278,528) 139,264 56,367 3,622,556
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 15.97%
MODIFIED RATE OF RETURN 14.52%
(87. reinvestment rate)
NET PRESENT VALUE 938,999
X Tax Benefits/Entire Retur 23.31%
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EXHIBIT 11 B
to be taxed at much lower rate than ordinary income. Only 40%
of the gain was taxed at the owner's marginal tax rate.
Assuming a 50% marginal tax rate, the actual tax was only 20%
of the total gain, a substantial savings.
THE PLAYERS
One syndicator told me that he markets fear and greed. His
clients' greed makes them interested in his offerings and the
fear that they will lose out closes the deals. Syndicators are
opportunists, marketing partnerships which they think will
sell. They respond to benefits created by Congress and market
a product that fits well into the market. They target their
products for potential investors by assessing the investor's
interests. They work together with developers and lawyers to
determine the appropriate risks and rewards for each partner
given the needs of potential investors in a given economic
market.
The syndicator's reward is earning lucrative fees for
structuring and marketing equity investments for syndication
as well as a piece of the residual. Before TRA'86 tax benefits
were so substantial, investors could afford the syndicator's
large fees, which could go as high as 35% of the funds raised.
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The syndicator's share of the residual in a good market is
worth even more than substantial fees.
The developer and the syndicator can be one in the same
party. When they are, the syndicator initially takes on the
capital risk by buying the target property before there are
any investors or financing. The large fees they collect
represents compensation for the large risks they take on.
Developers benefit from syndications in a number of ways.
By raising the initial equity necessary for a new project,
syndication allows developers to lay-off the project's largest
risk (known as the capital or front-money risk) onto passive
investors. It also provides a means for developers to become
involved with larger, more complex projects by giving them
access to larger sources of equity capital. In addition to
raising equity capital, the typical limited partnership
structure also generates ongoing fees to the developer for a
variety of services such as acquiring, developing, managing,
and leasing the property.
Until TRA'86 investors bought limited partnerships largely
for the tax shelters they offered. Many limited partnerships
offered investors as much as $3 or $4 of losses in the initial
years for every dollar invested. It was not unusual for
individuals to purchase a limited partnership in late December
12
and receive tax benefits for the entire calender year. The
tax benefits were not prorated.
Purchasing a limited partnership in real estate did not
eliminate an investor's tax liability; it only deferred the
liability to the future. Tax deferral created savings in two
ways. First, the investor deferred the cost of taxes and
reduced the real cost of the taxes due to the time value of
money. Second, when the taxes finally became due at the time
of sale, the tax rate was reduced from 50% to 20% because the
net effect of tax deferral was to convert ordinary income to
capital gain.
In addition, syndications offered investors an interest in
a real estate with limited liability (usually only the capital
invested is at risk), some portion of the cash flow and
residual, and a hedge against inflation. Many syndications
were extremely good economic deals and the investors benefited
greatly.
SUMMARY
Congress enacted tax advantages to stimulate real estate
investment, and the syndication industry responded by making
real estate investment more accessible to the small investor.
In short, markets responded and the availability of real
13
estate limited partnerships increased. The syndication
industry dramatically grew.
However, there were excesses with many non-economic deals
where the sole purpose was to create tax losses. Public
attitudes towards tax shelters changed . The result was the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 which made significant changes in the
tax code. These had profound implications for real estate
syndications.
The next chapter will examine these changes.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE NEW TAX LAWS
"The pastoral ideal has been used to define the meaning of
America ever since the age of discovery, and it has not
yet lost its hold upon the native imagination."
Leo Marx, Th. Machine in tag Garden, 1964
In the classic Gone with Ua& Wind Scarlett finally
declares that "Tara is all that really matters," and we
understand. It is the American dream to own one's own home
and land.
The tax system has long reflected this American obsession
by allowing tax advantages for real estate investments that
have never been available to other investments. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 dramatically reduced or eliminated many of these
advantages. This chapter will review some of the changes,
their intent, and their effect on real estate syndication.
These changes include:
* Dividing income into three categories: active,
passive, and portfolio. Losses can only offset income
from the same category.
* Reducing individual tax rates. The highest
bracket,formerly 50%, now is only 28%.
* Lengthening the depreciation period from 19 years to
27 years for residential and 31.5 years for commercial
properties.
* Eliminating preferential capital gains treatment for
long-term investments.
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* Limiting the amount of investment interest
deductions.
* Extending the "at-risk" rules as they apply to real
estate.
* Limiting the availability of Investment Tax Credit
(ITC) for low-income housing to certain classes of
investors.
* Reducing the amount of ITCs available for historic
properties.
This chapter will not detail every clause of the new tax law
but rather will serve as an overview.
LIMITATION OF PASSIVE LOSSES
TRA'86 redefines income into three categories: active,
passive, and portfolio. Active income is income "actively"
earned such as wages. All real estate income (losses and
credits) earned in activities in which an individual does not
"materially participate" is defined as passive income. Thus,
most investors' income (losses and credits) from limited
partnerships is defined as passive. Portfolio income is earned
from investments other than real estate and royalties.
Congress' intended to eliminate tax shelters through this
provision, and appears to have been successful. An investor's
share of tax losses from a limited partnership now can not be
used to offset salary, other professional earnings, or
portfolio income. This rule alone radically changed the market
16
for real estate syndications. Prior to TRA'86 almost all
limited partnerships offered the investor her investment back
in the form of tax losses; these losses were often large
enough to offset the taxes of the wealthy. Investors purchased
limited partnerships at the end of the year, received the tax
advantages for the entire year, and had their capital free
most of the year.
Some observers thought this new provision would create a
market for limited partnerships with low or no leverage
properties in order to create the necessary passive income to
offset the passive losses investors had acquired through debt-
laden pre-TRA'86 limited partnerships. In fact, new limited
partnerships can almost never offer enough passive income to
offset the losses of pre-TRA'86 deals. Consider the case of a
prototypical investor we shall call Danielle.
In 1984 Danielle owed over $50,000 in taxes and she
decided to invest in a limited partnership. For the first
three years she paid-in $10,000 a year and received $30,000 in
losses in each of the first three years, then lower amounts of
losses in later years. These high write-offs occur because of
the use of non-recourse debt financing for the project; debt
which Danielle gets to include in her depreciable basis. Thus,
by investing $10,000 in 1984, Danielle was able to offset
$30,000 of income. In a 50% marginal tax bracket, she reduced
17
her tax liability by $15,000. Thus, in the first year of the
investment she had no out-of-pocket expense, and realized a
net benefit of $5,000.
In 1987 during the phase-in period of the new tax law,
Danielle could only use a portion of the losses from the
limited partnership to offset her income. She needed some
passive income to offset the remaining losses from the limited
partnership, now defined as passive losses. She decided to
investigate no-leverage limited partnerships offering passive
income. She invested $10,000 per year for the next three
years in a limited partnership offering a guaranteed 7%
return. The first year she earned $700 in passive income of
which $400 was already sheltered by the project's
depreciation.
So for the same $10,000 for which she earned $30,000 in
losses in 1984, Danielle now earned $300 of passive income.
Danielle will never be able to invest enough to offset the
passive losses from her pre-TRA'86 limited partnership. There
are, however, other reasons for the popularity of the new low
or no-leverage limited partnerships. These reasons will be
discussed in chapter four.
The Congress set up a phase-in period and also allowed
for some losses for individuals earning less than $150,000.
Most passive losses will be carried forward and used to offset
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taxes due on sale. With the time value of money, these losses
diminish in value each year an investor holds them. These
provisions have cushioned the impact of TRA'86 in the short-
run. However, the change in an individual's5 ability to offset
income with passive losses fundamentally changes the
incentives for purchasing real estate syndications. Investor's
interests no longer lie with losses.
REDUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RATES
TRA '86 reduced individual marginal tax rates. The highest
tax bracket (50%) was reduced to 28% and is triggered at
$29,750 (jointly) and $17,850 (for individual).
This new provision has implications mainly for limited
partners of pre-TRA'86 debt-laden real estate syndications.
Looking at Danielle's case again, she would owe $84 of tax
from her $300 of passive income if she had not had passive
losses to shelter it from taxes. Before tax reform, she would
have owed $150 of taxes for the same $300 of income if she did
not have losses to offset it. As a result of tax reduction
suddenly the passive losses worth $150 are now only worth $84
and only for a limited class of income.
5. Rules for corporations are different.
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DEPRECIATION
Before TRA'86 all property was depreciated over 19 years
as a result of the 1984 tax laws. Now, commercial property
placed in service after December 31, 1986 is depreciated over
31.5 years. Residential properties, including low-income
housing, now have a depreciable life of 28 years.
The impact of changing the depreciable life of a building
can be illustrated using the same $10 million property
discussed in chapter one. Exhibit 12 A and 12 B shows the same
property with the same mortgage under the new tax law. I have
assumed that the property is placed in service after the
phase-in period. The changed depreciable life affects two
major elements: the amount of losses and the property's basis
at sale. With a depreciable life of 31.5 years, the amount of
losses, now defined as passive losses, are substantially
reduced. In addition, the adjusted basis of the property at
sale ($8.2 million) is much higher than in the pre-TRA case
($6.9 million) which causes the amount of gain ($3.8 million)
to be lower than the gain in the pre-TRA'86 example ($5.1
million).
20
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POST TAX REFORM '96 EXAMPLE (Assumes a 28% tax rate and all passive losses are carried forward to sale.)
PURCHASE PRICE 10,000,000
MORTGAGE AMOUNT 8,000,000
INTEREST RATE 10.00%
TERM 30
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE) 31.5
HOLDING PERIOD 7
SALES PRICE 12,000,000
CASH FLOW 1 2 3 4 5 6
NET OPERATING INCOME 850,000 850,000 890,000 895,000 900,000 901,000 905,C
LESS: ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE (848,633) (848,623) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (845,E
CASH FLOW BEFORE TAXES 1,367 1,367 41,367 46,367 51,367 52,367 56,i
TAXABLE INCOME
NET OPERATING INCOME 850,000 850,000 890,000 895,000 900,000 901,000 905,(
LESS. INTEREST (800,000) (795,136) (789,786) (782,902) (777,428) (770,308) (7E2,
LESS: DEPRECIATION (253,96B) (23,968) (25,9B) (253,968) (253,968) (253,968) (253,1
REAL ESTATE TAXABLE INCOME (203,968) (199,104) (15-,754) (142,870) (131,396) (123,276) (111,
(Nov defined as passive incose(losses))
ADJUSTED BASIS
ORIGINAL BASIS 10,000,000 CALCULATION OF TAX LIABIL:TY IN SALE
LESS:DEPRECIATION (1,777,778) ------------------------------------------
-------------- SALES PRICE 12,000,000
ADJUSTED BASIS S,222,22: ADJUSTED BASIS (8,22,222)
GAIN 3,777,778
PASSVE LCSSES (1,065,9:3)
SALE PROCEECS TAXABLE GAIN 2,711,965
TAXES "UE 2It 753,350
SALEE P(7cE ,0000
PROCEEDS ATTER TAXES 3,702,04S
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EXHIBIT 12 A
Megan M. Dobroth
POST-TAX REFORM
BENEFIT STREAM
YEAR
1
2
4
5
6
.7
NET
DISTRIBUTABLE
CASH FLOW
1,367
1,367
41,367
46,367
51,367
52,367
6,37
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
MODIFIED RATE OF RETURN
(8% reinvestment rate)
NET PRESENT VALUE
ANNUAL
AFTER-TAX
CURRENT
RETURN
1,367
1,367
41,367
46,367
51,367
52,367
3,75S,416
10.44%
10.38%
305,849
EXHIBIT 12 B
INDIVIDUAL CAPITAL GAINS
Under the new legislation, the 60% long-term capital gain
exclusion was eliminated. This rule permitted deferral of
taxes and also effectively converted ordinary income to
capital gains. Taxing 40% of the gain in the 50% tax bracket
amounted to a tax of 20% under the old rules.
Gain is now taxed at the same rate as ordinary income (28%
in most cases). Some of the incentive for investing in long-
term investments like real estate over other more liquid
investments are removed. Without tax deferral, real estate
syndication investors are more interested in immediate cash
flow rather than losses and a part of the residual.
In the example of the $10 million property, the owner pre-
TRA'86 had to pay taxes on 40% of a gain of $5.1 million or on
$2 million. In the 50% marginal tax bracket, the tax due on
sale was $1 million. Under the new tax laws, the passive
losses ($1 million) can be used to offset the already lower
gain of $3.8 million. The taxable gain ($2.7 million) is
taxed at a higher rate of 28% (as opposed to an actual 20% tax
rate under the old laws) producing a tax liability of
$760,000.
At first glance it may appear that the owner is paying
less tax under the new tax rules. But under the old tax law
23
over $1 million of taxes were sheltered during the life of the
project; under the new tax laws, none of the tax is sheltered.
Thus, the net amount of taxes paid under the old law was
$200,000 ($1.2 million sheltered and $1 million paid) and
$760,000 under the new tax laws.
LIMITATION ON INVESTMENT INTEREST
TRA'86 expands the investment interest limitations in
several ways. Investment interest is interest paid or accrued
on debt incurred for purchasing or carrying a property. It is
now deductible only to the extent of net investment income.
These new rules will have little impact on syndications since
interest attributable to the passive loss rules will not be
subject to investment interest provisions.
"AT-RISK" RULES EXTENDED
Perhaps the most significant allowance historically
given real estate was an exclusion of the "at-risk" provision.
Even though a taxable owner may not have been personally
liable for the underlying mortgage debt, the owner was able to
depreciate the full cost basis of the asset, including the
portion financed by debt.
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The new law extends the "at-risk" rules to encompass real
estate activities, including the holding of personal property.
In the case of real estate syndications, a limited
partner's depreciable basis includes not only the taxpayer's
cash she has invested and debt for which she is personally
liable, but also that partner's share of qualified non-
recourse debt.6 To qualify for inclusion in basis, non-
recourse debt must be obtained from and guaranteed by the
federal, state, or local government or from a financial
institution whose primary activity is lending. As a practical
matter, these rules do not significantly inhibit the ability
of limited partners to obtain the benefits of non-recourse
debt because of the wide availability of such financing from
qualified lenders. However, the use of non-recourse debt now
generates passive losses which have lower value than before
tax reform.
COMPLICATED REQUIREMENTS FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSING ITC
Low-income housing Is a classic example of use of the tax
code to achieve socially desirable objectives. The typical
low-income housing partnership offered no real cash flow and
6. Philip J. Wiesner,CPA,"Syndications. Is There Life
After Tax Reform?", Journal of Accountancy, November 1986, p.122.
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had little or no appreciation. Tax benefits in the form of
losses were one of the few true elements of value used to
entice investors.
In the past, these tax benefits from low-income housing
have been as high as $4 of losses for each $1 of cash
invested. TRA'86 changed the benefits in two significant ways:
lengthening the depreciation period from 15 year 200% double
declining balance to 27.5 years, and reducing individual tax
rates. The result of these changes is that during the first
five years of an investment the tax benefits are only 22% of
what they were before tax reform.7
Congress now offers tax credits to attract investors to
low-income housing. Tax credits work differently from tax
losses. The credits can be used for a dollar for dollar direct
reduction of taxes due. There are numerous and often tricky
requirements that a syndicator or developer must meet to
qualify for purchase.
Investor .requirements have also changed. Investors in
low-income housing have traditionally been very high income
earners. Under TRA'86 individuals with adjusted gross income
under $200,000 may credit up to $25,000 a year against taxes
owed on income from any source (not just passive).
7. R. G. Richardson, "Subsidized Housing after Tax
Reform," Financial Product News, January- February 1987, p.26.
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Individuals with incomes between $200,000 and $250,000 may use
increasingly smaller percentages of the credit. This means
that the ideal investor is someone who knows that her income
will not go over $200,000 throughout the holding period of the
project and will not use up the $25,000 reduction allotment on
other shelters.
REDUCTION OF ITCs AVAILABLE FOR HISTORIC PROPERTIES
The rehabilitation tax credit is retained but reduced to
20% for certified historic properties and 10% for non-historic
properties placed in service before 1936.
HOW THE NEW RULES WORK TOGETHER
The operating rules governing investment interest,
depreciation, and "at-risk" rules are applied first, followed
by the new rules limiting passive losses. Any passive losses
that are not used are carried forward for use at sale.
SUMMARY
The example of the $10 million dollar property shows the
dramatic change in the benefit stream for a property under the
27
new tax laws. Exhibit 12 A and 12 B shows the same property
purchased at the same price with the same mortgage and the
same projected net operating income. The modified rate of
return (with an 8% reinvestment rate) is only 10.38% compared
with a 14.36% return before tax reform. The net present value
is only $306,000 compared with $978,000 before tax reform.
Given these changes in the tax law, the market for limited
partnership syndications must have changed. The next chapter
will describe the structure of limited partnerships prior to
tax reform. The ways in which syndications have adapted is
the subject of chapter four.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE STRUCTURE OF REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS
PRIOR TO THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
Syndicators and developers seek equity to fund new
projects and, therefore, structure their limited partnership
offerings to attract investors. This chapter will describe the
structure of four typical and successful pre-tax reform
syndications: two conventional upgraded garden apartment
buildings and two low-income apartment buildings. In all
cases the developer and syndicator are the same party.
CONVENTIONAL GARDEN APARTMENTS
The two syndicated projects chosen for this study, Rolling
Green8 and Stony Brook9, raised $1.7 million and $1.85
million, respectively. Stony Brook is a midwestern 248 unit
apartment complex. The syndicators planned to spend $400,000
to upgrade the project. Rolling Green is a 170 unit apartment
complex also located in the midwest.
8. See Exhibit 1A and 1B.
9. See Exhibit 2A and 2B.
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SYNDICATOR'S FEES
One financial planner with whom I spoke referred to
syndicator's fees as "revolving mirrors" because so many of
the fees can be hidden in the syndication offering. Careful
investigation of the prospectuses of Stony Brook and Rolling
Green shows that 26.7% and 20.3% of the equity raised,
respectively, was paid directly to the syndicators for their
efforts. These fees were paid in the first year. They
included fees for sales, acquisition, organization,
consulting, and salaries.
In his article, "How to Read a Syndication Prospectus,"10
Allen Cymret warns that any time a syndicator's fees are
greater than 15% of the capital raised and are paid in the
early years of the project, it may be a sign that the project
is non-economic. While many syndicators claimed fees of 10%-
15% in the early years, once adjusted for fees hidden in
complicated legal clauses the percentages often climb closer
to 25% to 30%. In order to understand whether the project was
truly economic, it is important for the investor or her
10. Allen Cymret,"How to Read a Syndication Prospectus,"
Real Estate Review, p.68.
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financial planner to investigate the underlying economic
assumptions of the projects.
Many fees are hidden. The syndicators of both projects
have a provision to receive any remaining funds from a reserve
account they have called the "Operating Deficit Reserve
Account". In both cases the reserve fund covers any deficit
due to operation. Many syndicators have as many as three
different reserve accounts in which they collect the remaining
funds. The Rolling Green syndicators, for example, created
provisions giving them the benefits of any remaining working
capital and any upside of interest rate changes. This type of
hidden fee can create perverse incentives for the
syndicator/developer. Since he profits for any unused funds,
he may choose to cut corners in order to save money rather
than spending necessary funds. None of these fees or the
syndicator's share of the benefit stream are included in the
upfront fees discussed above.
SPLITS
The components of the benefit stream of any project are
the cash flow, tax benefits, and the residual. The allocation
of the benefit stream between the partners is often called the
splits. The general partners of both Rolling Green and Stony
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Brook named an affiliate to receive a percentage of the
splits. For the purposes of this paper, the total of the
splits of both the general partner and his affiliates is
considered the syndicator's share.
The splits for both Rolling Green and Stony Brook are the
same. The investor received 98% of the cash flow and 98% of
the tax benefits. At sale or refinancing the investor
received all of his initial capital back and 80% of the
remaining proceeds.
LEVERAGE
Since these projects are highly leveraged, the investors
received most of their investment back initially as tax
losses. Rolling Green is 65% leveraged In other word, 65% of
project covered by debt and 35% by equity. When the
syndicator's fees are taken into account, the amount af equity
in the project goes down and the leverage goes up to 69.8%.
Similarly, Stony Brook is 72.1% leveraged and adjusting for
the syndicator's fees makes the leveraged percentage increase
to 77.44%
32
RATE OF RETURN
These syndications offered their investors excellent rates
of return. The internal rate of return for Rolling Green is
26% and for Stony Brook is 26.3% Modified rates of return,
assuming an 8% rate of reinvestment, are a better measure of
performance. The modified rates of returns were 19.7% and
22.9% respectively. Since the investor's contribution is paid
over four years, the modified rate of return is still a bit
high.
Syndicators offer an installment schedule for investor
payment for a number of reasons. Not only is the rate of
return higher, but the investor can deduct the interest to
create more losses. Also, more investors are able to pay
smaller sums over time than to pay one large lump sum. This
makes the investment very attractive to end-of-the-year
purchasers. By investing small out-of-pocket savings, they
can reduce their tax liability substantially.
Tax benefits comprise the large portion of the investor's
return in both syndications. The Rolling Green return is 56%
tax benefits. Stony Brook return is almost entirely tax based
with 91% of the return made up of tax benefits.
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LOW-INCOME HOUSING
Syndications for low-income housing projects were very
different from other syndicated projects. The investors
received $2, $3, or even $4 in tax benefits for each dollar
invested. Instead of paying taxes to the government,
investors paid for low-income housing.
The two low-income housing syndication offerings chosen
for this study, Palm Court and Redwood Forest, raised $3.2
million and $15.3 million, respectively. Palm Court is a 60
unit new low-income housing development. The Redwood Forest
offering was comprised of a little more than a 1% interest in
each of five different existing low-income housing projects
located in Georgia and Texas. The total number of housing
units in all five projects is 354.
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
Low-income housing syndications had very high fees. Since
the investors were offered enormous tax losses, they would
tolerate (or more likely they did not care about) the large
syndicators' fees.
The Palm Court project is an excellent example. Over 43%
of the capital raised is paid to the syndicators within the
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first three years. These fees are allocated to commissions
(25%), organizational fees (50%), and acquisition and other
fees (25%). They also receive an annual fee for their services
and an additional portion of the splits.
The Redwood Forest syndicator's fees amount to 23% of the
equity raised. In addition, the syndicator receives an average
of 1.04% of each building's gross rental. Hidden fees also in
this syndication change the splits.
THE SPLITS
Low-income housing does not offer significant cash flow or
appreciation so that the only valuable part of the benefit
stream is the tax benefits.
In the Palm Court deal, the investors receive 90.5% of the
cash flow (not expected to be more than $555 per year) and
90.5% of the tax benefits. The general partners and their
holding company receive the other 9.5%, apportioned 5% and
4.5% respectively. At sale or refinancing, the investors and
the general partners split the proceeds after returning the
initial capital.
After adjusting the splits for annual fees paid to the
general partners, the investors In the Redwood Forest
partnership receive 98.5% of the cash flow and the tax
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benefits . At refinancing or sale, the investors receive 99%
of the proceeds after paying a hefty disposition fee to the
general partners.
Since low-income housing does not appreciate in value and
can actually decline in value due to the deterioration of the
property, most investors do not plan on receiving any monies
at the end of the holding period.
LEVERAGE
Low-income housing is highly leveraged; many of the
mortgages come from the government. The Palm Court project is
69% leveraged. When the syndicator's fees are taken into
account, the leverage goes up to 89%. The Redwood Forest
projects are leveraged an average of 61%. Adjusting for
syndicator's fees the leverage amount goes up to 65% and
adding in the interim loan for investor pay-in, the leverage
goes up to 75%.
36
ANNUAL RATE OF RETURN
Both syndications offer their investors excellent rates of
return. Palm Court has an internal rate of return of 42% and
Redwood Forest has 53.5%. Modified rates of return, assuming
an 8% rate of reinvestment offer a better measure of
performance. Palm Court then offers a 15.4% return and
Redwood Forest offers a 20% rate of return. These returns are
largely comprised of tax benefits. Tax benefits comprise 86%
of the Palm Court return and 97% of the Redwood Forest return.
SUMMARY
Analysis of typical limited partnership deals show that
their structure capitalized on investors' interest in tax
benefits. By using high leverage and financing investors'
contributions, syndicators achieved the highest proportion of
tax benefits possible. Many of the offerings sought ways to
maximize write-offs and minimize the economics of the deal.
Some critics of real estate syndications have alleged that
syndicators went so far as to buy buildings that were loosing
money, put a high amount of leverage on them, and then not
attempt to improve profitability in order to create the
largest amount of tax losses possible. They claimed that
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programs sought to maximize write-offs and minimize
economics.11
Since tax benefits comprised the largest proportion of
investors' benefit, the returns on these limited partnerships
had a high degree of certainty. Regardless of the project's
performance, the tax benefits remained the same. Tax reform or
a decline in a taxpayer's shelterable income were the only
ways that investors would not receive the tax related portions
of the benefit stream.
Many investors did not care about the economics of a
project, assuming that they would receive adequate return form
the tax benefits alone. If the project succeeded, then the
additional benefits provided by cash flow and appreciation (in
the form of the residual) were seen as gravy.
Chapter four analyzes at how syndication structures have
changed since tax reform.
11. Quoting Gregory Nooney of Nooney Co. in: Margaret
Opsata, "Leveraged Perceptions," Financial Planning, May 1987,
p. 68.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
NEW STRUCTURE FOR REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS
Chapter one discussed how real estate tax incentives
provided by Congress achieved their primary goal: investment
in real estate. Syndicators used the incentives created by
tax laws and developed a product which attracted investors.
This chapter will examine how syndicators have adapted to the
new market created by tax reform.
TRA'86 reduced the value of tax losses to investors. Cash
flow has become more important and the goal of syndicators is
to maximize cash flow. There are many ways to increase a
project's cash flow; these include changing the amount of
leverage and diversifying the make-up of the offering's
holding to include non-real estate investments. Both of these
options require returns that are based on the economics of the
project. A real estate asset can perform poorly economically
for any number of reasons. It can be poorly located and does
not lease, or it can be poorly managed and does not release or
any number of other reasons. Thus, syndication deals are
riskier investments since TRA'86.
This chapter will look at several new products which have
been introduced into the market since TRA'86. An examination
of the structure of these products show how syndicators have
39
dealt with the issues of leverage, fees, returns to investors,
and the division of the benefit stream. Three different kinds
of syndications will be analyzed: conventional garden
apartment syndications with financial projections, blind pools
for conventional projects where the property is not specified,
and low-income housing blind pools.
EFFECTS OF LOWERING OR ELIMINATING LEVERAGE
Many of the new programs have reduced or eliminated
leverage. Many investors mistakenly have come to view
leverage and shelters as one-in-the-same because leverage
contributed heavily to the creation of tax shelters. Many
investors are seeking all-cash limited partnerships,
forgetting that much of the wealth of the country was made
with the use of leverage.
All-cash projects concentrate capital, decreasing the
ability to diversity. Unleveraged properties are very safe;
investors have very limited exposure. They also produce more
cash flow because there is no debt service. If an investor
has only $100,000, she can probably invest in only one
property worth $100,000. The use of leverage gives investors
the opportunity to diversify their portfolio holdings. Using
leverage, she can probably invest in $800,000 worth of
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property in four different geographic locations. While she
would have more exposure with each property, using leverage
allows her to expand her portfolio and diversify the risk
involved with a single investment. Although the cash flow may
be reduced, equity appreciation potential is far greater. When
deals are all-cash, real estate is not as certain a hedge
against inflation.
There is an inherently negative side to eliminating
leverage. It reduces the prospects for significant equity
appreciation. For example, suppose that an investor purchases
the same $10 million property discussed in chapter 1 and holds
it for seven years. It appreciates significantly and is sold
for $16 million. Exhibit 13 compares the effect of financing
the property with an $8 million interest only mortgage (or 80%
leverage) to buying it all-cash (unleveraged). While the
property appreciated the same amount in both scenarios, the
equity appreciated far more with leveraged. The rate of
return of the leveraged property is significantly higher at
19.49% as opposed to 5.54% return of the all-cash property.
In the present economic climate, all-cash deals can also
lose out on the effects of positive leverage. A building that
produces a 10% cash flow and is financed at 9.5% benefits from
the effect of positive leverage.
41
Megan M. Dobroth
EFFECT OF LEVERAGE ON POST TAX REFORM '(Assumes a 281 tax rate
LEVERAGED
PURCHASE PRICE
MORTGAGE MOUNT
INTEREST RATE
(Interest only)
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE)
HOLDING PERIOD
SALES PRICE
ADJUSTED BASIS
ORIGINAL BASIS
LESS:DEPRECIATION
ADJUSTED BASIS
CALCULATION OF TAX LIABILITY ON SALE
SALES PRICE
ADJUSTED BASIS
GAIN
PASSIVE LOSSES
TAXABLE GAIN
TAXES DUE (282)
SALE PROCEEDS
SALES PRICE
LESS: MORTGAGE
LESS: TAX LIABILITY ON SALE*
PROCEEDS AFTER TAXES
YEAR
I c,000,00c)
203 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 5, 22,222
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
10,000,000
8,000,000
10.001
31.5
7
16,000,000
10,000,000
(1,777,778)
8,222,222
16,000,000
(M,222,222)
7,777,778
0
7,777,778
2,177,778
16,000,000
(8,000,000)
(2,177,778)
5,822,222
19.49
UNLEVERAGED
PURCHASE PRICE
MORTGAGE AMOUNT
INTEREST RATE
TERM
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE)
HOLDING PERIOD
SALES PRICE
ADJUSTED BASIS
ORIGINAL BASIS
LESS:DEPRECIATION
ADJUSTED BASIS
CALCULATION OF TAX LIABILITY ON SALE
SALES PRICE
A2JUSTED BASIS
GAIN
PASSIVE LOSSES
TAXABLE GAIN
TAXES DUE (281)
SALE PROCEEDS
SALES PRICE
LESS: MORTGAGE
LESS: TAX LIABILITY ON SALE*
PRDZEES AFTER TAXES
YEAP
1 (10,000,000)
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 13,822,222
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 5.541
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10,000,000
0
31.5
7
16,000,000
10,000,000
(1,777,778)
6,222,222
16,000,000
7,777,778
0
7,777,778
2,177,778
16,000,000
0
(2,177,778)
13,822,222
EXHIBIT 13
The effects of leverage on the new syndications will be
carefully analyzed in this chapter.
ALL-CASH DEALS
All-cash deals attract investors because of the security
they offer. Now investors need to be more concerned with the
economics of the building. Without a mortgage, the partnership
is freed from the risk of losing its building through
foreclosure. In addition, without a mortgage payment, the
amount of cash flow is increased. With no mortgage, there is
no mortgage interest deduction and the amount of tax losses
are reduced. The lengthened depreciation period shelters
enough of the income to give the investors the cash flow
without taxes due.
A building occupied by AAA rated tenant with a triple net
long-term lease is the ideal property for an all-cash
syndication because it has a reduced releasing risk. This
guarantees little, if any, fluctuation in the cash flow. In
effect, an investment in such a building is akin to a bond
with comparable returns. There Is an inherent problem when an
all-cash syndication chooses this type of property. The
property must increase in value by 10%, 15%, or even 20% in
order to overcome the cost of the front-end fees and still be
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worth enough to return the investors' capital at the end of
the first three years, as many syndicators offer.12 That kind
of appreciation without leverage can usually only be realized
on a distressed property which has been turned around.
The typical proforma holding periods for all-cash
syndications are the same as pre-TRA'86 syndications, 5 to 7
years. The holding period, prior to tax reform, was
determined by analyzing when the interest deductions had
declined so much that the tax benefits were not as valuable as
capitalizing on the residual. The new holding period should
be longer since tax benefits are no longer valued. A good
income producing property should be held for a longer period
of time.
All-cash syndications are more bond-like in nature and
represent a shift toward more safe investments. The perfect
investor for an all-cash deal is a very conservative
individual who would trade appreciation for current field and
safety.
Finally, since many investors are purchasing without
leverage, it has become more difficult to obtain discounts for
all-cash purchases.
12. Margaret Opsata, "Leveraged Perceptions," Financial
Planning, May 1987, p.71.
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Before analyzing an all-cash deal, conventional
syndications with leverage and financial projects will be
analyzed.
CONVENTIONAL SYNDICATIONS
The two conventional syndications offerings examined in
this chapter, Oak Park and Ocean Crest, raised $2.8 million
and $50 million, respectively. Both offer investors financial
projections. Oak Park is a garden apartment complex comprised
of 296 units. Ocean Crest is a 1,222 unit high-rise market
rate rental apartment complex.
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
The upfront fees in these syndications have not changed
much from the pre-TRA'86 syndications. The syndicators' fees
for Ocean Crest and Oak Park were 23% and 24% of the equity
raised, respectively. These fees are paid in the first year.
The number of hidden fees in these offerings have
increased and are paid later than the fees in the pre-tax
offerings examined in earlier chapters. There are three
typical kinds of extra fees, all of which were common in pre-
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TRA'86 deals but were not all used in the pre-TRA'86 limited
partnerships analyzed in this paper.13
In both the Oak Park and Ocean Crest projects, there is an
annual fee paid to the syndicator from the net operating
income. These fees are called investor services and
partnership administration fees, and are charged for the
administration of the partnership.
Both syndications also charge fees for arranging necessary
services. The companies that provide the service, often an
affiliate of the syndication company, also charge a fee. Thus,
the partnership pays double fees for necessary services. Both
syndications charge a fee for arranging for property
management. They do not provide the service.
The last type of hidden fee was found in both of the pre-
tax deals. Syndicators claim any remaining funds in any
reserve account or take any advantage created by changes in
the market which make the returns greater than forecasted.
Ocean Crest has a number of these including:
* An incentive management fee equal to 20% of any
excess of actual net cash flow distributable to
investors in any year that the distributable cash flow
is greater than forecasted for that year.
* A contingent fee equal to an amount, if any, by
which interest actually paid on the commercial loan in
any year is less than the forecasted amount after
13. See Exhibit 14.
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deductions for repayment of any interest shortfall
loans.
* A contingent fee equal to the amount, if any, by
which interest earned on the reserve account is
greater than the amount of interest forecasted to be
earned in the financial forecast.
* The greater of $425,000 or 5% of the amount expended
in connection with the renovation and capital
improvement program.
The fee structure has adapted with individual fees based on
cash performance of the project. Thus, the fees reflect the
investor's need for a well performing cash flow.
SPLITS
The splits for these new partnerships appear to be not
very different than the pre-TRA'86 deals. Investors receive
95% of the cash flow and 97% of the taxable income in the
Ocean Crest offering. They get their capital back at sale
plus an 8% cumulative non-compounded return and 75% of the
remaining proceeds. Similarly, investors in the Oak Park
receive 98% of the cash flow and the taxable income. At sale
the investors receive their capital back plus an 8% cumulative
non-compounding return, then 80% of the remaining proceeds.
The splits are stated in a way that it is clear that the
investor may not see the cumulative non-compounded return
until the dissolution of the partnership. The new all-cash
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deals, as will be seen, attempt to promise more. The returns
for post-TRA'86 deals are only as good as the performance of
the underlying real estate holdings.
The Oak Park limited partnership gives investors a small
amount of portfolio income in the form of interest earned on
the reserve accounts.
Both syndications give investors the option of using the
passive losses during the transition period. All remaining
losses are carried forward to offset the gain at sale.
Until the property is sold the only benefit the investor
receives is cash flow. These syndications offer investors a
larger annual cash return on their investments.
LEVERAGE
Some syndicators are now talking of offering properties
with lower leverage in order to increase the cash flow.14 In
these syndication deals the amount of leverage has not
changed.
The Oak Park project is 67% leveraged, much the same as
the pre-TRA'86 limited partnerships. When this percentage is
adjusted to take into account syndicator's fees (which
14. Opsata, "Leveraged Perception." EE.
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decreases the amount of equity), the leveraged amount goes up
to 72%.
The Ocean Crest project has a lower amount of debt over
the life of the project. It is only 44% leveraged or 51% when
the syndicator's fees are deducted from the equity, much lower
than typical pre-TRA'86 deals. The amount of debt is greatly
increased by the interim loan for the phased investor pay-in,
bringing the leverage up to 93.5% for the first three years.
The syndicators are the originators of this loan and earn the
interest on it. The installment method benefits both investor
and syndicator. The investor can more easily afford the
limited partnership and receives a higher rate of return. The
syndicator makes money on the loan. When the pay-in period
ends, the reduced amount of leverage should provide more cash
for the investors.
RATES OF RETURN
The rate of returns are lower than the pre-TRA'86 returns.
The internal rates of return for Ocean Crest are 12.9% for the
cash method and 18.1% for the installment method. The
modified rate of return (assuming an 8% reinvestment rate) are
11.9% for the cash method and 14.4% for the installment
method. Oak Park's rates of return are similar. The internal
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rate of return is 18.1% (cash method) and 22.1% (installment
method). The modified rate of return is 16.8% (cash method)
and 25.4% (installment method). Looking at the Table
Comparing All Syndication Components (Exhibit 14), the returns
on Ocean Crest are much lower than the pre-TRA'86 deals. Oak
Park offers only a slightly lower return than the pre-TRA'86
syndications.
All of these returns assume that the property will preform
as projected. While the tax benefits of the pre-TRA
syndications did not vary regardless of the economic climate,
the returns of these limited partnerships are linked to the
property's economic success. Unlike the TRA'86 returns which
were largely based on tax benefits, these syndications' main
benefit is the cash flow which must rely on the performance of
the real estate assets.
BLIND POOLS
Blind pools are syndications that raise equity without
specifying the properties to be purchased. They have become
far more common since TRA'86. Prior to TRA'86 investors were
less concerned when projects did not meet their financial
projections since tax benefits did not depend on the economics
of a project. Now that tax benefits are not the most important
50
Megan M. Dobroth
TABLE OF COMPARISON OF ALL SYNDICATION'S COMPONENTS
----------------- 
------------------- --- - - - ------ -
nPRE-TRA '86H* ****n#POST- TRA'86mununnu*n*n** un****4***
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GLACIER GLACIER
ROLLING STONY OAK OCEAN VIEW VIEW TANGLE
GREENS BROOK PARK CREST (unlever)(lever) FALLS
----------------- 
----------------------------------- 
--- - ------ ------------
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
----------------------------------------------- 
------------
% Fees/ Capital Raised 20.24% 26.70% 23.291 23.151 18.001 15.70% 13.85%
2 Commission/ Upfront Fees 49.42% 0.001 42.94% 38.88% 44.44% if# 57.76%
1 Organizational cost/ Upfront Fees 11.63% 49.21% 14.261 13.57% 22.22% mf# 21.66%
Any remaining portion of operating reserve yes yes no yes M *if m4*
Any remaining portion of working reserve yes no no yes m*4 m* *4e
Any benefit from change in loan terms yes no no yes ** * *
Annual fee for servicing partnership no no yes yes *m* * m*
Double fee for providing certain services no no yes yes yes yes yes
% MBS/ Total Investment 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 30.00%
--------- ---------------------------------------------------
SPLITS (Investor: Syndicator)
Taxable Income 98:02 98:02 *4 44 *4 H 
Cash Flow 98:02 98:02 98:02 97:03 100:0+ 100:0+ 93:07+
Sales Proceeds (See individual ixhibits.)
LEVERAGED AMOUNT
------------------------------------------------------------------
% Leveraged 64.862 72.111 67.221 44.59 0.001 70.00% 0.00%
% Leveraged with adjustment for fees 69.75% 77.441 72.77% 51.15% 0.00 m4* 0.00
I Leveraged with adjustment for fees 69.75% 77.44% 72.771 93.57% 0.00% m 0.00%
and interim loan
RATES OF RETURN (Installment Method)
---------------- 
-------------------------------------------------
Internal Rate of Return 26.00% 26.30% 22.10% 18.10% ++ ++ ++
Modified Rate of Returnl 19.70% 22.90% 25.401 14.40% ++ ++ ++
% Tax benefit/ Total Investor Benefits 55.79% 90.77% -2.231 0.00% ++ ++ ++
RATES OF RETURN (Cash Method)
Internal Rate of Return * 18-10% 1Z-9C% ** +*f I*
Modifiec Rate of Peturn+ ++ ++ 6.80% 11.90% m m +4
6 Tax Benefit! Total Investor Benefits +C + -2.23 0.00. m44 mif *
N U Y-L + ++ ++--- ++ 7.- - 6-------- ---------- --
GUARANTEED CURRENT YIELD ++ ++ ++ ++ 7.0.0 .50%.
+ Reinvesteent rate of 8%.
#4 Passive losses carried forward to sale.
+*4 Unknown.
+ After certain returns and certain fees are paid.
++ Not Applicable.
51
EXHIBIT 14
Megan M. Dobroth
TABLE OF COMPARISON OF ALL SYNDICATION'S COMPONENTS LOW INCOME HOUSING
**PRE-TRA '86** *POST- TRA'86*
PALK REDWOOD BIRCH
COURT FOREST BLUFF
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
% Fees/ Capital Raised 43.64% 22.39% 35.03%
% Comsission/ Upfront Fees 25.16% *** 22.831
2 Organizational cost/ Upfront Fees 50.221 *** 23.18%
Any retaining portion of operating reserve no no no
Any retaining portion of working reserve no no no
Any benefit from charge in loan teras no no yes
Annual fee for servicing partnership yes yes no
Double fee for providing certain services yes yes yes
SPLITS (Investor: Syndicator)
Taxable Incose (90.5):(S.5) (9E.5):(1.5) 94:06
Cash Flow (90.5):(9.5) (98.5):(0.5) 94:06
Sales Proceeds (See individual exhibits.)
LEVERAGED ADUNT
I Leveraoed 62.87% 61.12% **
I Leveraged with adjustment for fees 75.91 64.981 **+
RATES OF RETURN (Installaent Method)
Internal Rate of Return 42.00% 53.50% 51,801
Modified Rate of Return' 15.401 20.701 2.00"
I Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Benefits 85. 2 9 7.19% 61.92%
* Reinvestment rate of 8%.
+** Unknown.
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EXHIBIT 15
element of the benefits stream, blind pools have become a
means for syndicators to avoid the difficulties of accurately
projecting cash flow and residual amounts, both of which can
easily change as a result of a number of economic factors.
Any project expected to have cash flow shortfalls, as many do
during their initial years, can be more attractively marketed
in a blind pool syndication.
Investors have become more concerned with the economics of
a syndication since returns are closely linked to performance.
If investors are not provided with financial projections,
they must rely heavily on the track record of the syndicator.
Syndicators new to the industry will not find it easy to
market blind pools.
The remaining four syndications analyzed in this chapter
are all blind pools. Two of the syndication offerings, like
many on the market today, describe the properties the
syndicators intend to buy. No financial projections are
offered in the prospectus for any of the limited partnerships.
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TO BUY LEVERAGED OR UNLEVERAGED?
Although most syndicators believe that leveraged offerings
are a better product for most people, many investors are more
interested in unleveraged properties. Thus, most syndicators
offer both types of syndications to investors.
Glacier View's two blind pools are examples of a typical
syndicator's offerings. The unleveraged offering will raise a
maximum of $25 million and will own 50% of a $42 million
commercial property. The syndicator's fees reduce the amount
of capital available for investment to $20 million. The
leveraged offering will raise a maximum of $50 million and
will invest in 8 to 10 properties worth approximately $140
million. The syndicator hopes to leverage 70% loan to value on
the total value of all partnership properties on a combined
basis. The leveraged limited partnership offers the advantage
of a more diversified portfolio.
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
The unleveraged syndications spend 18% of the capital
raised on syndicator's fees, somewhat lower than pre-tax
reform syndications. In addition to the up-front fees, the
syndicators charge a fee of 0.5% of the net value of all
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partnership properties each year. This fee, together with 6%
of the up-front fees, are lent by the syndicators to the
partnership at an interest rate of 8.5% to be used to meet any
shortfalls in investors' annual return from cash flow.
Eventually these fees must be paid and the investors will pay
fees with interest before receiving any of the sales proceeds.
This requires that the property must appreciate substantially
in order for the investors to get their capital contribution
out of the back end. If the partnership is dissolved in the
sixth year, then the property must appreciate a total of 66%
or 11% a year in order to pay all the investors the 7.5%
annual return (45% total) , the syndicators fees (18% upfront
plus 3% over time), and return the investor's capital.
In the leveraged syndication offering, the syndicator
structured his fees in a different manner. The marketing
brochure for the deal assures investors that all of the
capital raised will go directly into purchasing properties.
The investors have secured a loan from an affiliate at a
variable rate to pay for the front-end fees. The loan will
also cover any portion of the partnership management fee which
must be used to cover shortfalls in the investors' annual
return of cash flow. This fee, which is designed to pay the
syndicators for managing the syndication, is 0.5% of the gross
asset value of all partnership properties. The interest on the
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loan is paid monthly with a portion of it going to the
affiliate for arranging the loan. The loan is paid off at sale
after investors have received their initial capital back. Many
all-cash syndications propose to deal with syndicators' fees
in the same manner. If they do not use a variable rate loan,
the syndicator may have to use a short-term call or some other
form of protection for the lender, if favorable rate are not
available at financing.
Investors may pay more for fees in the end than they did
prior to tax reform when the fees are paid with a loan due at
sale. In this case, the variable rate will be increased when
the economy slows down, sales fall, companies cut expenses,
and vacancies go up. Cash flow to the investor will probably
have to be covered by the annual partnership management fee--
which will now also be at a higher rate. The fees can grow to
a rate where the sales proceeds available to investors are
substantially reduced.
Syndicators structure their fees to maximize their profit.
If they felt that they would get a better return by taking a
percentage of the real estate's performance, they could have.
It is interesting to note that the loans used to finance the
fees bear higher coupon rates than the investors are
guaranteed from their investment in the unleveraged property.
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Since this is a leveraged property, equity appreciation
will probably pay for most of the front-end fee loans and the
investors will still receive more than their initial capital
back at sale. In the case of all-cash deals, this method of
paying for fees could mean no return from the residual for
investors because the equity appreciation rate is too low.
In addition to these fees, the syndicator gets fees for a
number of services. It appears that many of these service
fees are double fees. For example, the property management fee
is 6% of gross receipts if an affiliate provides the service,
and 3% if it does not. Since investors are more concerned with
the economics of the deal, they should be concerned that these
services are well performed.
THE SPLITS
The unleveraged syndication guarantees investors a minimum
of 7.5% per annum non-cumulative return, paid quarterly. The
syndicators defer their fees if this amount is not achieved in
any year. If the cash flow is greater than the 7.5% non-
compounded return, investors get the any remaining cash flow
which remains after the payment of syndicator's fees.
At sale investors receive their remaining capital
contribution back, then 85% of the remaining proceeds. If the
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85% is not enough to give investors a 125% priority return,
then the syndicator gives up both his fees and his share of
the residual until the priority return is paid. He is only
guaranteed the $3 million not included in the front-end loan.
In the leveraged syndication investors are guaranteed a 5%
return on their investment the first year. Then the syndicator
receives his partnership management fee. If there is
additional cash flow remaining, investors receive it all.
After the first year, investors receive 100% of the cash flow
after the syndicator's partnership management fee is paid.
Since the properties are highly leveraged at 70%, the cash
flow could remain small throughout the life of the project.
Investors get their true benefits at the dissolution of
the partnership. At sale, investors receive their remaining
capital contribution back before the front-end loan is repaid.
Then investors receive 6% cumulative non-compounding return.
Finally the remaining capital is split 80:20 between investors
and the syndicator, respectively.
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RATE OF RETURN
During the life of the limited partnership, the all-cash
deal yields a rate of return of 7.5%, non-compounded, which is
competitive with alternative investments such as money market
funds and certificates of deposits. However, this figure is
misleading since the 7.5% return is actually only a partial
return of capital. At sale, the partnership pays investors
the remaining portion of their capital contribution. Then the
modest gain is divided. The investors are guaranteed that they
will receive 125% return of their capital contribution so they
are actually only guaranteed a 25% return over the life of the
partnership. If the holding period is 5 years, then they will
get a minimum non-compounded return of 5% annually. If the
holding period is 10 years, the annual return is reduced to
only 2.5%, non-compounded. Although the actual rates of return
may be greater, the lack of leverage reduces the probability
of actually achieving high returns. In fact, many all-cash
deals do not guarantee returns before the syndicator's fees
become due. All-cash deals may prove to be a poor investment
compared to less risky money market or CDs. When the
appreciation rate is average to low, all-cash deals may only
return the original capital invested and a small yield.
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The leveraged syndication promises a much better return.
Although investors receive their capital back at a slower rate
(5% the first year, and then 100% of a small cash flow), the
equity should appreciate much more because of the heavy use of
leverage. The syndicator's fees will reduce the amount of
appreciation. If the property is held for seven years the
syndicator's fees will amount to almost $14 million dollars.
Even with these substantial syndicator's fees, investors
should receive a better return than alternative less risky
investments, or the expected return on the all-cash
syndication.
HYBRIDS
Many syndicators were concerned that the all-cash
syndications would not be able to attract investors if the
annual cash flow was not greater than alternative investment
options such as money markets and CDs. Some syndicators
developed a new "hybrid" syndication more capable of assuring
investors of a higher and more secured annual cash flow. This
was accomplished by diversifying the portfolio within the
limited partnership with other income producing investments.
A prototypical hybrid uses between 50% to 70% of the
capital raised to buy real estate and the remainder to place
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debt to unaffiliated borrowers. The equity component gives
current cash flow from the net operating income and some
promise of appreciation at sale. The debt component delivers a
steady, predictable income from the mortgage payments. The
combined yields satisfy many investors. It is also one of the
safest investments.15 The main risk of unleveraged real
estate lies in the lack of diversification--which the hybrid
addresses. The debt element is often secured by the government
with mortgage backed securities (MBS).
The hybrid blind pool analyzed for this paper is 70%
unleveraged real estate and 30% mortgage back securities. The
limited partnership plans to raise $250 million to invest in
$151 million in real estate and the remainder in MBS.
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
The syndicator's fees, at 13.85% of the capital raised,
are the lowest of all the partnerships discussed in this
paper. These are the only syndicator's fees beside normal fees
for services such as acquisition, brokerage, or property
management.
15. Margaret Opsata, "Cultivating Hybrids," Financial
Planning., April 1987, p.101.
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To avoid the criticism that investors could easily
purchase the MBS on their own, many syndicator either charge
no fee for purchasing and managing the MBS or reduce their
fees altogether.16
SPLITS
The splits are more complicated than all the syndications
already discussed. Until 1991, the investors receive 6.5% non-
cumulative annual return on their investments. Then, if there
is cash remaining, the syndicator receives 5% of the cash
flow. Next, if there is still money remaining, the investors
receive up to 93% of the cash flow. Finally, the syndicator
gets any of the remaining cash flow which could be as high as
2% of the total. After 1991, the investors still receive 6.5%
non-cumulative annual return on their investment. The
remaining splits are given until all of the cash flow -has been
distributed. The syndicator receives 5% of the cash flow; then
investors receive up to 90%; next, the syndicator gets 7%;
then the investors get 8%; finally the syndicator receives 3%.
When the property is sold the investor receives the first
distribution of proceeds. They are paid the amount necessary
to make the sum of all their annual payments equal to their
16. Opsata, " Cultivating Hybrids," p. 105.
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initial investment. Next, the syndicator gets all invested
capital back. The investors are first in line for the profits.
They receive enough of the net proceeds to give them 12% per
annum for all fiscal years If this is less than 90% of the
cash flow, then they get the additional amount. The
syndicators receive any of the remaining which could be as
high as 10% of the cash flow.
RATE OF RETURN
One of the partnership goals is to "provide a possible
hedge against disinflation in expectation that the partnership
interest in MBS could be sold at a gain in the event of a
general decline in interest rates." In fact, Ginnie Maes and
other MBS are not good investments to hedge against
disinflation. While they do offer great safety, their yields
continue to drop as homeowners refinance their homes during
periods of low inflation.
The annual returns of the hybrids promise to be higher
than other all-cash syndications because the MBS assure a
certain amount of cash flow. The cash flow distribution is a
combination of passive and portfolio income. Investors owe
taxes on the portfolio income which will not be sheltered.
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when the partnership sells its assets, the appreciation
rate on the equity will be very low because it is an all-cash
investment. The real estate portion is further diluted because
the MBS delivers little or no appreciation. Thus, the 90:10
split may mean little. 90% of nothing is nothing.
LOW-INCOME HOUSING
Congress never intended to reduce investment in low-income
housing when it attacked abusive tax shelters. In order to
keep low-income housing attractive, Congress introduced a tax
credit that can be used to shelter income from any source.
Unlike the other new syndications, the tax credit is the
main, if only, benefit in low-income housing syndications.
There is little or no cash flow and no guarantee that
investors will receive their initial capital investment back
at the dissolution of the partnership. And unlike the other
new syndications, the economic vitality of the project is not
linked to whether the investors receive their benefits.
Qualifying a project for low-income housing can be
difficult. Numerous complicated rules must be met. For
investors the most troubling rules apply to time requirements.
Even though the tax credits end after ten years, a project
must be held for at least 15 years. Investors receive no
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credits at all during the final years. They may continue to
deduct property depreciation, but with the lengthening of the
depreciation period from 15 to 27.5 years, the write-off is
less valuable and it can only be used to offset passive
income. In addition, if at any time during the 15 years the
percentage of low-income tenants drops below the minimum
standards, all or part of the tax credits are subject to
recapture. This means that the investor must give the tax
credits back to the government.17
The post-TRA'86 low-income housing syndication analyzed
for the paper is a blind pool. Since the benefits are
essentially assured regardless of the property, the syndicator
has provided investors with a financial schedule of benefits.
The Birch Bluff syndication raises $1.5 million dollars.
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
Syndicator's fees remain high with low-income housing
syndications. Like the Palm Court pre-TRA'86 syndication, the
fees are 35% of the capital raised. The syndicators have set
up a two tiered partnership where they get fees for creating a
partnership that holds the limited partners and the property.
17.Margaret Opsata, "New Rules, Old Economics," Financial
Planning, February 1987, p.50.
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By using this system, they receive more compensation both in
the way of fees and in the partnership's shares of benefits.
These fees are much higher than many low-income partnerships
are reporting.18
THE SPLITS
The investors receive only 94% of the tax credits
generated. While this is only 5% lower than most pre-TRA'86
partnerships, the tax credits are really the only benefits the
investors can be receive. If there is cash flow, they receive
94% of it and if there is a sale, they receive their capital
investment back and then 49.5% of the sale proceeds.
LEVERAGE
The partnership plans to highly leverage the property with
government funds.
18. Opsata, "New Rules.." F.P., p.52.
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RATE OF RETURN
This syndication offers investors returns similar to pre-
TRA syndications. They are only slightly more risky than pre-
TRA'86 syndications. The investors will only lose the tax
credits if the project does not meet the government rules, if
the investor does not meet government requirements19, or if
the government changes the tax rules again. Assuming that the
investor does not receive any proceeds at the dissolution of
the partnership, the internal rate of return is 50.5%. If she
does receive proceeds at sale the internal rate is 51.8%. A
more accurate measure is the modified rate of return using an
8% rate of reinvestment. The rate of return is then 20.6%
with out sale proceeds and 25% with them. These rates are
similar to pre-TRA syndications of any kind. The tax benefits
account for a large proportion of the return, 62%, like many
of the pre-TRA'86 deals.
19. If the investor's income goes above $250,000 any time
during the investment period, she may lose the tax credits.
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SUMMARY
This chapter describes many of the syndication structures
on the market today. While prior to tax reform limited
partnerships offered investors very high returns with little
risk, the new syndications' success depends upon the economic
vitality of the real estate assets. The annual returns are
often unpredictable and just competitive with less risky
alternative investments when leverage is not used.
Low-income housing syndications are the one exception.
They remain not strongly linked to the economic vitality of
the real estate asset and offering a rate of return far above
alternative investments.
The next chapter will look at the possible future of real
estate syndications in their present form.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY: WHERE ARE REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS GOING?
Chapter one showed how syndicators recognized an
opportunity in the market and created a product that attracted
numerous investors. It was a product with little risk and
high returns. The tax reform act altered the value of the
benefits of real estate syndications. Chapter two described
these changes. Chapter three analyzed the structure of
limited partnerships prior to tax reform. Chapter four
analyzed the new syndication structures and how the market has
adapted to offer investors a new and better-suited product.
This chapter will summarize and critique the new syndication
market.
COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL SYNDICATIONS
Table 1 compares all the syndications discussed in this
paper . The elements of comparison are the same as the ones
discussed in this paper (e.g. syndicator's fees, splits,
leverage, rate of return).
Syndicator's fees are lower now but still remain as high
as syndicators think investors will accept. Only the limited
partnerships with financial projections were similar to the
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pre-TRA'86 syndicator's fees. Since these syndications had
financial projections and took advantage of the transition
period by offering their investors some losses, the true value
of the syndicator's fees were clear. The remaining
syndications were blind pools where a portion of the fees
remain linked to the unknown performance of the property. If
the cash flow does not return an adequate return to investors
yearly, these fees are carried forward at a interest rate
which give the syndicator's a substantially higher yield. In
the case of the leveraged blind pool, the fees are entirely
paid by the partnership at sale. The syndicator receives his
fees at the front-end and the interest from the partnership to
carry the cost to sale.
The new splits are similar to the pre-TRA'86 splits. Both
favor the investor. The investors, however, cannot be as sure
of achieving the advantages of the stated benefits. While the
tax benefits, which were 50% to 97% of the total pre-TRA
benefit stream, were assured regardless of the economic
vitality of the real estate assets, the cash flow element of
the new syndications are more risky. If the property is
poorly located and does not perform, is poorly managed and
does not release well, or experiences any other kind of
economic trouble, the investors may not see their return. In
many cases, the annual returns are actually only a partial
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repayment of invested capital. If the first distribution at
sale is repaying the remainLg capital investment, and then
the syndicator gets his fee or a share of the proceeds, then
the investor does not receive any real return until the third
distribution of proceeds, and then only if there is capital
remaining. In some all-cash deals, the proceeds may make
returns unlikely if the real estate asset did not perform
extremely well. A 99:1 sharing arrangement means little if
there is nothing left to share.
The pre-TRA syndications used leverage to help create
their major asset, tax benefits. Today's leveraged
syndications offers modest write-offs from mortgage interest
and depreciation, and places a major emphasis on growth. They
to almost the
syndications, at approximately
syndications may have a slightly
that there is a better trade off
appreciation.
The return on investment
reform. The days of returns as
gone. Most syndications which d
the transition period, will have
a period of high inflation.
same degree as pre-TRA'86
70%. In the future, more
lower leveraged percentage so
between cash flow and equity
was much higher prior to tax
high as 25% or even 35% are
o not offer any losses during
high returns unless there is
In that case, the annual cash
return may be lower with the overall return higher.
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are leveraged
Current yields of pre-TRA limited partnerships were
guaranteed to the extent that returns were derived from tax
benefits. Syndicators who say current yields are equivalent to
tax benefits of pre-TRA'86 are blowing smoke. It is
impossible to get as low a risk and as high a benefit. The
annual current yields of all-cash deals, made up of cash flow,
are between 5% and 7.5%, like the all-cash syndication in this
paper. The current yield of the leveraged syndications, at
times, may be a bit higher than present all-cash deals, partly
due to the use of positive leverage. Since these rates are
often the same or very slightly higher than much more secure
investments like money markets and bank certificates of
deposit, many syndicators developed hybrid limited
partnerships with current yields of 8% to 10%. In the present
economic environment these yields may look attractive. If
inflation returns and CD offer a 16% yield, investors will not
be pleased with their limited partnerships unless rents go up
at a similar or greater rate. Many purchasers of all-cash
syndications may be surprised when the partnership is sold and
they receive no more than their original investment and the
annual yield as their return.
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MARKET DRIVEN PRODUCTS
Unleveraged limited partnerships are the hottest product
on the market today. Market driven products do not always
make solid economic sense. They can quickly create an
oversold market based on poor economic sense, like Houston.
All-cash syndications and the hybrids are basically
incompatible with real estate fundamentals. Real estate has
never been a liquid asset; it is a patient asset which
requires time to see appreciate. Leverage is the traditional
means to create wealth. These syndications have discarded
these elements and try to compete with more liquid assets on
their terms. The future will show whether investors are
willing to trade the traditional benefits of real estate for
short term gains.
Syndicators sell people what they want rather than what
they need. The slick marketing pieces of the unleveraged
syndications have contributed to a large marketplace appeal.
In the end the main benefit of these syndication may be that
it has drawn more people into investing in real estate. My
guess is that these unleveraged syndications will be short-
lived.
Ultimately, investors must look beyond a syndicator's
promises to the likelihood that the syndication, through its
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structure and economic assumptions, will be able to meet its
goals. The syndicator's track record is more important than in
the past because it is harder to live up to the new promises
of real estate syndication returns. Investors in blind pools
must rely even more heavily in the syndicator's past
performance. In light of these changes, the syndication
industry should continue to consolidate.
THE FUTURE OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING
Table 1 compares low-income syndications before and after
tax reform. The risk level and reward are only slightly
lower. Even so, the future of low-income housing as an
investment partnership and as a means to house the poor
remains uncertain. The new restrictions on investor income
changes the investor make-up from the wealthy to the middle
class and reduces the amount of shelter that can be used. In
addition, the complicated rules a project must meet to qualify
makes it more difficult for low-income housing to be built.
Housing of the poor may reach crisis proportions unless
there are modifications made to the tax laws dealing with low-
income housing. The number of poor is growing as there is
increasing disparity between the upper and lower classes in
this society. The new tax rules do not easily promote the low-
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income housing. In addition, the new tax laws are likely to
increase the cost of rental housing throughout the country.
Syndicated properties are rental by definition. As
syndicators look to increase cash flow, one of the obvious
solutions raising the rent. The difference between subsidized
and market rent will increase with less low-income housing
available. Many of the poor may have to look to the streets
unless there are changes promoting low-income housing or a
better voucher system which allows the poor more opportunity.
SUMMARY
The market for real estate syndication has been
dramatically reduced since tax reform. The new syndications
offer investors excellent opportunities when real estate
fundamental are used in the structure. Leverage remains an
important tool to increase wealth.
Syndicators will continue to develop new products as long
as they can interest buyers. Fear and greed are a part of
human nature and syndicators will always find a market.
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NOTES ON ANALYSIS OF SYNDICATIONS OFFERINGS
The syndications offerings analyzed in this paper are
confidential and have been disguised for use in the paper.
Syndicator's fees were defined as any fee which a
developer would not have to pay if she was not syndicating the
building. Fees for such services as leasing, property
management, construction, or development, therfore, are not
syndicator's fees unless the partnership is charged twice (or
double) for them. Any fees for organizing, servicing, selling,
or maintaining the syndication partnership are considered
syndicator's fees.
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ROLLING GREENS EXHIBITS 1 A and 1 B
Project Name:
Based upon:
Offering Date:
Type:
Holding Period:
ROLLING GREEN
PRE- TRA '86
DECEMBER 31, 1985
APARTMENTS
8 YEARS
Total Project Cost:
Mortgage Amounts:
Advances from seller and/or buyer:
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:
Equity Raised for property:
Interim Loan for LP pay-in period
% Fees/ Capital Raised
% Leveraged
% Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's
% Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's
fees)
fee and installment pay-in)
SPLITS INVESTORS GENERAL PARTNER CLASS B PARTNERS
Taxable Income 982 1% 1%
Cash Flow 98% 1' 1%
Sale Proceeds Capital back based on 10% of any remaining 10% of any remaining
$85,500 unit size, then proceeds after Investor proceeds after Investor
0% of remaining proceeds. receive capital tack receive capital back
GENERAL P RTNER AND CLASS B PARTNERS BENEFIT SCHEDULE
BR3KERA&E & NEti* TAXABLE+*
SYNDICATION DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME
YEAR EEs CASH FLW (LOSS)
1985
1986
1957
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
344,000 37
542
883
lOE
9E2
2,485
2,114
BREAKDOWN F SYNDICATOR'S UPFRONT FEES
I Fees/ zapital Raised
I Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees
. Organizational Fees/ Total Upfront Fees
(3,115)
(9,278)
(8,217)
(6,399)
(4,522)
(2,33)
(T4)
(245)
** These figures reapre5ert :oth the G (F and Class S partners (%; for a ttal cf 2.
(a) General Partner will receive the balance, if any, resaining Operating Deficit Reserve Account after the fourth
installment date as an operating deficit guarantee fee and will recieve $50,000 in reimbursemert of closing costs.
(b) In the event that at February 1, 1929 any or all of the $50,000 working capital reserve has not beer. exhausted, such
amount will be paid to the General Partners.
(c) In the event that the costs and interest or the Commercial Loan are less than $252,000, the difference
will be paid to the General Partners.
84
4,909,000
3,184,000
25,000
1,700,000
344,000
1,356,000
0
20.24%
64.86%
69.75%
69.75%
20.24%
45.42%
11.63%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Megan M. Dobroth
ROLLING GREENS EXHIBIT I C
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
ANNUAL PERCENT
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX ANNUAL
CAPITAL INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUTABLE CURRENT AFTER-TAX
YEAR CONTRIBUTION (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLOW RETURN CURRENT RETURN
1985 7,500 (7,631) 3,816 90 3,906 52.1%
1986 22,000 (22,732) 11,366 1,327 12,693 43.0%
1987 20,000 (20,131) 10,066 2,163 12,229 24.7%
1986 18,000 (15,678) 7,839 3,444 11,283 16.7%
1989 17,500 (11,103) 5,552 4,806 10,358 12.2%
1990 (5,709) 2,855 6,088 8,943 10.5%
.1991 (1,920) 960 7,629 8,589 10.11
1992 (601) 301 8,;26 8,627 10.1%
TOTAL 85,000 (85,505) 42,753 3-,873 76,626
This schedule assumes a 50% tax bracket.
Cash Distibution from Proceeds* 119,429
Taxes Dueme (31,906)
Net Benefit Upon Sale 67,523
Cuaulative Tax Benefit (Cost) 42,753
Cumulative Net Distributatle Cash Flow 33,873
Total Net After-Tax Return Per Unit 164,149
Original Investment 85,000
Internal Rate of Return 26.0%
Modified Rate of Return (8% reinvesteent rate) 19.7%
Net Present Value (8% discount rate) 32188
I Tax Benefits/ Entire Return 5.791
#Assumes a $25,000 sales price per Lcrit.
mAssumes Capital Gains treatment
+**+ 0 **** +****+ ++++++++***+++++++...+++++++++**+++**++*++++. + m mm
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STONY BROOK EXHIBIT 2 A and 2 Be
Project Name:
Based upon:
Offering Date:
Type:
Holding Period:
STONY BROOK
PRE- TRA '86
AUGUST 8,1985
APARTMENTS
4 YEARS
Total Project Cost:
Mortgage Amounts:
Advances from seller and/or buyer:
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:
Equity Raised for property:
Interim Loan for LP pay-in period
2 Fees/ Capital Raised
I Leveraged
I Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's
% Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's
fees)
fee and installment pay-in)
SPLITS INVESTORS GENERAL PARTNER CLASS B PARTNERS
Taxable Income 96% 1% 11
Cash Flow 98% 1I 1%
Sale Proceeds Capital back based on 1% of any remaining 19% of any remaining
$92,500 unit size plus proceeds after Investor proceeds after Investor
an 8% cumulative non- receive capital back receive capital back
compounded return, then plus an 6% cumulative plus an 81 cumulative
80% of remaining proceeds. non-compounded return. non-compounded return.
-------------- 
-- ------------------------------- 
--- ---------
GENERAL PARTNER AND CLASS I PARTNERS BENEFIT SCHEDULE
ACQUISITIDNt NETi* TAXABLE**
AND OTHER DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME
YEAR FEES CASH FLOW (LOSS)
1986
1967
1988
1929
494, 00
BR:EAKDONN F SYNDICATOR'S UPFRONT FEES
I Fees/ Capital Raised
I Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees
I Organizational Fees/ Total Upfront fees
0 (12,426)
0 (11,441)
819 (9,642)
1,219 (6,579)
** These figures rEpresent both the EP (1) and Class B partners (1%) for a total of 2..
(a) eneral artner will receive the balance, if any, reiaining 0perating Deficit Reserve Account after the fourt.
installment date as an operating deficit guarantee fee and will recieve $50,000 in reimbursement of clcsing cstS.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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7,176,600
5,175,000
151,600
1,850,000
494,000
1,356,000
0
26.70%
72.11%
77.441
77.44%
26.70%
0
49.211
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------
Megan M. Dobroth
RCLLING GREENS EXHIBiT 1 C
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
ANNUAL PERCENT
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX ANNUAL
CAPITAL INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUTABLE CURRENT AFTER-TAX
YEAR CONTRIBUTION (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLOW RETURN CURRENT RETURN
1985 7,500 (7,631) 3,816 90 3,906 52.1%
1926 22,000 (22,732) 11,366 1,327 12,693 43.0%
1987 20,000 (20,131) 10,066 2,163 12,229 24.7%
19B8 18,000 (15,678) 7,839 3,444 11,263 16.7%
1989 17,500 (11,103) 5,552 4,806 10,358 12.2%
1990 (5,709) 2,855 6,088 8,943 10.5%
1991 (1,920) 960 7,629 8,589 10.1%
1992 (601) 301 8,326 B,627 10.1%
TOTAL 85,000 (85,505) 42,753 3,872 76,626
This schedule assuses a 50h tax bracket.
Cash Distibution froc Proceeds* 119,429
Taxes Duet* (31,906)
Net benefit Upon Sale 7,522
Cuaulative Tax Benefit (.ost) 42,753
Cusulative Net Distributatie Cash Fiow 32,873
Total Net After-Tax Return Per Unit 164,149
Original Investment 85,000
Internal Rate of Return 26.07
Modified Rate of Return (87 reinvestment Tate) 19.7%
Net Present Value (8 discount rate) 32,188
1 Tax Benefits/ Entire Return 55-73%
*Assuses a S?5,000 sales price per urit.
++*Assumes Capitai Eains treataent
ff .+.H. HH *HH+++ +H+e ++++++++H++++9+9"*++++++++
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STONY BROOK EXHIBIT 2 C
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
ANNUAL PERCENT
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX ANNUAL
INSTALLMENT CAPITAL INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUTABLE CURRENT AFTER-TAI
YEAR DATE CONTRIBUTION (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLOW RETURN CURRENT RETURN
1986 JUNE 15 38,000 (30,444) 15,222 0 15,222 40.1%
1987 JUNE 15 30,000 (2B,031) 14,016 0 !4,016 20.6%
1988 JUNE 15 24,500 (23,623) 11,812 2,007 13,819 14.9%
1989 (16,118) 8,059 2,986 11,045 11.9%
TOTAL 92,500 (98,216) 49,108 4,993 54,101
This schedule assumes a 50% tax bracket.
Cash Distibution from Proceeds* 149,829
Taxes Due (55,800)
Net benefit Upon Sale 94,029
Cumulative Tax Benefit (Cost) 49,108
Cumulative Net Distributatle Cash Flow 4,993
Total Net After-Tax Return Per Urit 148,130
Original Investment 92,500
Internal Rate of Return 26.3!
Modified Rate of Return (8 reinvestment rate) 22.9:
Net Present Value (8% discount rate) 2E,B37
I Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Return 90.77%
*Assumes a $35,000 sales price per unit.
***************************************************+******************************+
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Megan M. Dobroth
PALM COURT EXHIBIT 3 A
Project Name: PALM COURT
based upon: PRE- TRA '86
Offering Date: FEBRUARY 15, 1985
Type: LOW INCOME HOUSING
Holding Period: 18 YEARS
Total Project Cost: 3,215,625
Mortgage Amounts: 2,214,600
Advances fro& seller and/or buyer: 316,025
Capital Raised through Syndication: 685,000
Syndicator's Fees: 298,900
% Fees/ Capital Raised 43.64%
% Leveraged 68.87%
% Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's fees) 75.93%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPLITS INVESTQRS
Taxable income 90.5%
Cast Fiow 90.5%+
Sale Proceed= Capital back based on
$BC,500 urit size, then
50' of remaining proceeds.
GENERAL PARTNER
51
5%
50% of any remaining
proceens after Investor
receive capita. tak:
CLASS B PARINERS
4.5%
4.5% of any remaining
proceecs after Investor
receive capital back
* This amourt is not expe:ted to be greater than $555 per annut and a limitation is imposec by the FaHA as
an 8% limit.
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Megan M. Dobroth
PALX COURT EXHIBIT 3 B
GENERAL PARTNER AND CLASS B PARTNERS BENEFIT SCHEDULE
BROKERAGE & NET** TAXABLE**
SYNDICATION DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME
YEAR FEES CASH FLOW (LOSS)
BREAKDOWN OF SYN41CATOR'S UPFRON' FEES
I Fees/ Capital Raised
I Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees
I Organizational Fees/ Total Upfront Fees
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
298,900
plus 31,300
(interest)
** These figures represent
(a)
(b)
(c)
An Investor
The general
GP recieves
380
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
1,165
(25,158)
(34,775)
(28,292)
(23,046)
(17,868)
(15,227)
(12,695)
(10,333)
(10,094)
(9,901)
(9,128)
(9,760)
(7,539)
(7,434)
(7,327)
(4,556)
1,039
1,438
both tne GP (51) and Class B partners (4.5t) for a :otal of 9.5O .
Service Fee will be charged annually costing approximately $1400 per annus.
contraztEr will be an affliate of the partnership.
251,300 plus $76,700 as construction supervision fee.
90
43.64%
25.161
50.22%
Megan M. Dobroth
PALM COURT EXHIBIT 3 C
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
ANNUAL PERCENT
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX ANNUAL
CAPITAL INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUTABLE CURRENT AFTER-TAX
YEAR CONTRIBUTION (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLON RETURN CURRENT RETURN
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
6,000
8,300
6,700
5,500
4,200
3,550
(11,963)
(16,564)
(13,476)
(10,977)
(8,511)
(7,253)
(6,047)
(4, 922)
(4,808)
(4,716)
(4,348)
(4,649)
(3,591)
(3,541)
(3,490)
(2,170)
495
685
5,992
8,282
6,738
5,489
4,256
3,627
3,024
2,461
2,404
2,359
2,174
2,325
1,796
1,771
1,745
1,085
(248)
(343)
181
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
55
555
6,173
8,837
7,293
6,044
4,811
4,182
3,579
3,016
2,959
2,913
2,729
2,880
2,351
2,326
2,300
1,640
308
2'3
102.9%
61.8%
34.7%
22.8%
15.7%
13.6%
11.7%
9.8%
9.0%
9.3%
9.0%
10.0%
8.3%
9.4%
9.3%
6.6%
1.2%
0.9%
34,250 (109,866) 55,276 9,061 64,337
This schedule assuses a 50% tax bracket and that the investor say not get his orginal investment back at sale
Internal Rate of Return
Modified Rate of Return (81 reinvesteent rate)
Net Present Value (8% discount rate)
I Tax Benefits/ Total Investor Return
TOTAL
42.01
15.4%
1,700
85.92%
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Megan M. Dobroth
REDWOOD FOREST EXHIBIT 4 A
Project Name: REDWOOD FOREST (Five Low Income Housing Projects)
Based upon: PRE- TRA '86
Offering Date: MAY 29, 1994
Type: LOW INCOME HOUSING
Holding Period: 18 YEARS
Total Project Cost:
Mortgage Amounts:
Advances from seller and/or buyer:
Interim Loan for LP pay-in period
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:
Equity Raised for property:
X Fees/ Capital Raised
1 Leveraged
1 Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's fees)
I Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's fee and installment pay-in)
SPLITS
Taxable Income
Cash Flov
Sale Proceeds
15,277,742
9,337,275
394,000
1,485,467
4,061,000
909,237
3,151,763
22.391
61. 12%
64.981
75.32%
INVESTORS GENERAL PARTNER
991 Il
9 1a r 11
931% after paying fee to GP 11 plus fees
INVESTORS
9G.5%
9E.5%
99% after paying fee to EP
GENERAL P RTNER
1.51
1.5%
1% plus disposition fee. Equal
to 10% of gross proceeds of sale;
10% of refinancing; ur 15% of
gross proceeds of sales as condosinuies
or cooperatives.
* The adjusteent shown is for an Adainistrative and Reporting Fee. Other fees say be added in the future.
EXISTING LONG TERM SHORT TERN TOTAL INTEREST ON
PROPERTY MORTGAGE NOTE NOTE CASH ACMUISION SHORT TERr NOTE
2,706,920 1,390,029 75C,1 100,000 4,94E,920 56,%S9
2 ,5 ,0 5 0 60,00 1,341,5 2.99760,0c,,0 99
-!-r -' .00 7,?923 sig!35 359,%6 ~90,602 ,00 8243 7,9
.1,61..900 9.1,22E 172,025 1,000 ,040,056 76.97'
473,750 441,757 20,C8C 4E,000 ,086,310 2,197
TTL r5,64c,lec 17,63, ,42,46 19S00" :221'4"31,1
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ADJUSTED Sx2TSi
Taxable Income
Cash Flow
Sale Proceeds
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------- ------------- --------------------------------------------------------
Megan M. Dobroth
REDWOOD FOREST EXHIBIT 4 B
GENERAL PARTNER AND CLASS B PARTNERS BENEFIT SCHEDULE (C)
BROKERAGE & NET** TAXABLE*#
SYNDICATION DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME
YEAR FEES CASH FLOW (LOSS)
1984
19B5
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
909,237 0
0
0
0
0
0
472
472
472
472
472
472
BREAKDOWN OF SYNDICATOR'S FEES
Z Fees/ Capital Raised
I Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees
X Organizational Fees/ Total Upfront Fees
(17,184)
(30,780)
(26,720)
(20,960)
(18,883)
(15,484)
(12,085)
(11,236)
(11,519)
(10,197)
(9,725)
(11,047)
(c) In addition to the above fees, the GP receives an average of 1.04 of each apartment
building's gross rental income.
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22.39%
0.00
0.00%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------
Megan M. Dobroth
REDWOOD FOREST EXHIBIT 4 C
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
YEAR
1894
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
TAXABLE
CAPITAL INCOME
CONTRIBUTION CLOSS)
7,800
14,400
13,200
11,100
10,000
9,000
TAX
BENEFIT
(COST)
(18,200)
(32,600)
(28,300)
(22,200)
(20,000)
(16,400)
(12,800)
(11,900)
(12,200)
(10,800)
(10,300)
(11,700)
9,100
16,300
14,150
11,100
10,000
8,200
6,400
5,950
6,100
5,400
5,150
5,850
NET
DISTRIBUTABLE
CASH FLOW
0
0
0
0
0
0
500
500
500
500
500
500
ANNUAL
AFTER-TAX
CURRENT
RETURN
9,100
16,300
14,150
11,100
10,000
8,200
6,900
6,450
6,600
5,900
5,650
6,350
TOTAL 65,500 (207,400) 103,700 3,000 106,700
This schedule assuses a 50% tax bracket and that the investor say not get his original investment back at sal
Internal Rate of Return 53.5%
Modified Rate of Return (81 reinvestsent rate) 20.7!
Net Present Value (8% discount rate)
I Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Return
19,440
97.19!
*4**mu mm*++4+*+HmHf++ 4****+**fHHH4++*+HU ** ***4Hum*Hemem
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PERCENT
ANNUAL
AFTER-TAX
CURRENT RETURN
116.7%
113.2%
51.3%
28.7%
20.5%
14.2%
12.0%
11.2!
11.4%
10.4%
10.4!
11.9%
tmnwemn
------------- ---------------------------------------------------------
Megan M. Dobroth
OAK PARK EXHIBIT 5 A
Project Name:
Based upon:
Offering Date:
Type:
Holding Period:
OAK PARK
TRANSITION PERIOD
SEPTEMBER 1,196
APARTMENTS
5-7 YEARS
Total Project Cost:
Mortgage Amounts:
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:
Equity Raised for property:
Interim Loan for LP pay-in period
% Fees/ Capital Raised
% Leveraged
I Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's
% Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's
fees)
fee and installment pay-in)
SPLITS INVESTORS GENERAL PARTNER
Taxable Income 98% 2%
Cash Flow 98% 2%
Sale Proceeds Capital back based on 20% of any remaining proceeds
$56,000 unit size plus after Investor Limited Partner
an 8% cumulative non- receive capital back based on
compounded return, then $56,000 unit size plus an 8%
80% of remaining proceeds. cuisulative non-compounded return.
95
9,541,000
5,741,000
2,800,000
652,000
2,148,000
0
23.29%
67.22%
72.77%
72.77%
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Megan M. Dobroth
OAK PARK EXHIBIT 5 B
GENERAL PARTNER BENEFIT SCHEDULE
ACQUISITION MANAGING INVESTOR NET TAXABLE
AND OTHER AGENT SERVICE DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME
YEAR FEES FEES (b) FEE CASH FLOW (LOSS)
1987
1968
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
652,000 2,401
3,119
3,337
3,537
3,749
3,974
4,213
4,466
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
1,230
2,956
4,507
4,609
5,026
6,255
7,564
8,958
(6,560)
(7,616)
(5,567)
(3,918)
(1,310)
611
2,514
4,416
(b) Assumes that 5% of the funds set aside for day to
as a fee to the general partner's afffiliate.
day property management is collected
BREAKDOWN OF SYNDICATOR'S UPFRONT FEES
I Fees/ Capital Raised 23.29%
Z Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees 42.94%
SOrganizational Fees/ Total Upfront Tees 14.2E7
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Megan M. Dobroth
OAK PARK EXHIBIT 5 C
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
NET TAXABLE INCOME TAX
INSTALLMENT CAPITAL DISTRIBUTABLE PASSIVE PORTFOLIO BENEFIT
YEAR DATE CONTRIBUTION CASH FLOW (LOSS) (d) (e) (COST)
1987 ADMISSION 18,000 1,205 (10,849) 82 (32)
1988 FEB. 15 19,000 2,897 (9,820) 278 (78)
1989 FEB. 15 19,000 4,417 (5,556) 457 (128)
1990 4,517 (3,840) 472 (132)
1991 4,925 (1,284) 472 (132)
1992 6,130 599 472 (132)
1953 7,413 2,464 472 (132)
1994 8,779 4,328 472 (132)
TOTAL 56,000 40,283 (23,958) 3,177 (898)
(c) In 1987 the sarginal tax rate used is 38.5%; from 1988-1994 a 28% tax rate is used.
(d) All passive losses are held for disposition at sale.
Cash Distibution fros Proceeds 169,086
Taxes Due (42,054)
Net Benefit Upon Sale 127,032
Cuaulative Tax Benefit (Cost) (898)
Cuaulative Net Distributable Cash Flow 40,283
Total Net After-Tai Return Per Unit 166,417
Original Investment 56,000
Internal Rate of Return 22.1
Modified Rate of Return (E% reinvestment rate) 25.42
Net Present Value (81 discount rate) 44,005
Z Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Return -2.231
f+++++m*++++++u4*0e m m u mm H e mm++*m
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Megan M. Dobroth
OAK PARK EXHIBIT 5 D
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
CASH METHOD
NET TAXABLE INCOME TAX
INSTALLMENT CAPITAL DISTRIBUTABLE PASSIVE PORTFOLIO BENEFIT
YEAR DATE CONTRIBUTION CASH FLOW (LOSS) (d) (e) (COST)
1987 ADMISSION 51,300 1,205 (8,389) 92 (32)
198B
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
TOTAL
2,897
4,417
4,517
4,925
6,130
7,413
8,779
(7,660)
(5,456)
(3,840)
(1,284)
599
2,464
4,328
278
457
472
472
472
472
472
51,300 40,283 (19,238) 3,177
(78)
(128)
(132)
(132)
(132)
(132)
(132)
(998)
In 1987 the marginal tax rate used is 38.5%; from 1988-1994 a 28% tax rate is used.
All passive losses are held for disposition at sale.
Distributed interest on the working capital replacement
Cash Distibution from Proceeds
Taxes Due
Net Benefit Upon Sale
Cumulative Tax Benefit (Cost)
Cumulative Net Distributable Cash Flow
Total Net After-Tax Return Per Unit
Original Investaent
Internal Rate of Return
Modified Rate of Return (81 reinvestaent rate)
Net Present Value (8% discount rate)
I Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Return
169,086
(43,370)
125,716
(898)
40,283
165,101
51,300
18.1%
16.8%
41,561
-2.23%
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(c)
(d)
(e)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Megan M. Dobroth
EXHIBIT 6 A Megan M. Dobroth
Project Name:
Based upon:
Offering Date:
Type:
Holding Period:
OCEAN CREST
TRANSITION PERIOD
SEPTEMBER 1,1986
APARTMENTS
10 YEARS, 4 MONTHS
Total Project Cost:
Mortgage Amounts:
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:
Equity Raised for property:
Interim Loan for LP pay-in period
I Fees/ Capital Raised
% Leveraged
I Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's fees)
% Leveraged (adjusted for syndicator's fee and installment pay-in)
91,940,000
41,000,000
50,940,000
11,790,239
39,149,761
34,000,000
23.15%
44.59%
51.15%
93.57%
SPLITS INVESTORS GENERAL PARTNER
Taxable Income 97%
Cash Flow 971 3%
Sale Proceeds Capital back based on 25% of any remaining proceeds
$90,000 unit size plus after Investor Limited Partner
an 8% cumulative non- receive capital back based on
compounded return, then $90,000 unit size plus an 8%
75% of remaining proceeds. cumulative non-compunded return.
SPLITS ADJUSTED FOR FEES (See notes c through i)
Taxable Income 95% 5%
Cash Flow 95% 5%
Sale Proceeds (same as above) (sate as above)
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OCEAN CREST
EXHIBIT 6 B Megan M. Dobroth
GENERAL PARTNER BENEFIT SCHEDULE
ACDUISITION BROKERAGE & PARTNERSHIP NET TAXABLE
AND OTHER SYNDICATION ADMINISTRATION DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME
YEAR FEES FEES FEE (c) CASH FLOW (LOSS)
(a) 1986 5,605,639 6,194,600 0 940 (70,176)
1987 0 54,914 (118,142)
1988 110,000 69,776 (93,167)
1989 116,600 75,762 (43,675)
1990 123,596 106,904 (19,798)
1991 131,012 128,085 3,624
1992 138,672 151,087 3,974
1993 147,205 176,049 4,324
1994 156,037 203,147 79,123
1995 165,399 232,573 176,434
1996 175,323 264,503 211,515
(a) Represents 4 months (September I-December 31, 1986)
(c) Annual Partnership and Investor Service Fee commencing in 1968 and increasing 6% annually.
(d) Annual property management feeequal to4% if gross collections.
(e) Incentive Management Fee equal to 20% of any excess of actual net cash flow distributable to investors
in any year over distributable net cash flow forecasted for that year.
(f) Contigent fee equal to amount, if any, by which interest actually paid on the Comercial Loan in
any year is less than the forecasted aaount after deductions for repayment of any Interst Shortfall Loans
(g) Contigent fee equal to the amount, if any, by which interest earned on the Reserve Account is greater
than the amount of interest forecasted to be earned on the Reserve Account in the Financial Forecast.
(h) The greater of $425,000 or 5% of the amounts expended in connection with the Renovation and Capital
Improvement Program.
(i) Syndicator say in the future provide various additional services such as insurance brokerage, at
prevailing market rates.
BREAKDOWN OF SYNDICATOR'S UPFRDNT FEES
I Fees/ Capital Raised 23.15%
I Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees 38.88%
% Organizational Fees/ Total Upfront Fees 13.57:
100
OCEAN CREST
EXHIBIT 6 C Megan M. Dobroth
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
ANNUAL PERCENT
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX ANNUAL
INSTALLMENT CAPITAL INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUTABLE CURRENT AFTER-TAX
YEAR DATE CONTRIBUTION (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLOW RETURN CURRENT RETURN
(a) 1986 SEPT.1 3,150 (6,229) 3,115 48 3,163 301.2%
1987 FEB. 1 29,968 (9,859) 3,796 3,137 6,933 20.9%
1988 FEB. 1 29,968 (6,423) 1,734 3,986 5,720 9.1%
1989 FEB. 1 26,914 (3,016) 814 4,328 5,142 5.7%
1990 (1,340) 362 6,107 6,469 7.2%
1991 207 (56) 7,317 7,261 8.1%
1992 227 (61) 8,631 8,570 9.5%
1993 247 (67) 10,057 9,990 11.1%
1994 2,645 (714) 11,605 10,891 12.1%
1995 10,079 (2,721) 13,286 10,565 11.7%
1996 12,083 (3,262) 15,110 11,848 13.2%
TOTAL 3,150 (1,379) 2,939 83,612 86,551
(a) Represents 4 months (September 1-December 31, 1986) and return is annualized.
This chedule assumes a 50% tax bracket for the period September 1, 1986 through June 30, 1987
and a 271 tax bracket for the period July 1, 1987 through December 31, 1996. Capital gains rate is assued to be 27%.
Cash Distibution fro Proceeds 217,509
Taxes Due (57,394)
Net Benefit Upon Sale 160,115
Cumulative Tax Benefit (Cost) 1,939
Cumulative Net Distributable Cash Flow 83,612
Total Net After-Tax Return Per Unit 246,666
Original Investment 90,000
Internal Rate of Return I11
1Modifie. Rate of Return (87 reinvestment rate) 14.4%
Net Present Value (81 discount rate) 44,673
Z Tax Benefxts/ Iotal Investor Return
++*+++++++++++m e*H e ++~ H++ mu HH m ~ n
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EXHIBIT 6 D Megan M. Dobroth
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
CASH METHOD
ANNUAL PERCENT
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX ANNUAL
INSTALLMENT CAPITAL INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUTABLE CURRENT AFTER-TAX
YEAR DATE CONTRIBUTION (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLOW RETURN CURRENT RETURN
(a) 1986 SEPT.1 79,200 (4,009) 2,005 48 2,053 7.8%
1987 (6,749) 2,598 3,137 5,735 7.2%
1986 (4,751) 1,283 3,986 5,269 6.71
19B9 (2,495) 674 4,328 5,002 6.3%
1990 (1,131) 305 6,107 6,412 8.1%
1991 207 (56) 7,317 7,261 9.2%
1992 227 (618 ,631 9,570 10.8%
1993 247 (67) 10,057 9,990 12.6%
1994 4,520 (1,220) 11,605 10,385 13.1%
1995 10,079 (2,721) 13,286 10,565 13.3%
1996 12,083 (3,262) 15,110 11,848 15.0%
TOTAL 79,200 8,228 (523) 83,612 83,089
(a) Represents 4 months (September 1-December 31, 1996) and return is annualized.
This schedule assumes a 50% tax bracket for the period September 1, 1986 through June 30, 1987
and a 27% tax bracket for the .eriod July 1, 1997 through December Z1, 1 96. Capital gains rate is assumed t
Cash Distibution fro& Proceeds 217509
'axes Due (57,697)
Net Benefit Upon Sale 159,812
Cumulative Tax Benefit (Cost) (523)
Cusulative Net Distributable Cash Floy 83,612
Total Net After-Tax Return Per Unit 242,901
Original Investment 79,200
interna Rate of Return 2. S
Aodified Rate of Return (SI reinvestment rate) 1.9%
Net Present Value (8V discount rate) 35,46
Tax Benefits' Total Investor Return
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GLACIER VIEW (leveraged) EXHIBIT 7 A and 7 B
Project Name:
Based upon:
Offering Date:
Type:
Holding Period:
GLACIER VIEW (leveraged)
POST- TRA 'BE
JANUARY 13, 1987
UNKNOWN (many commercial)
4 to 9 YEARS
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:*
Equity Raised for property:**
I Fees/ Capital Raised
1 Leverage**#
Total anticipated asset value of properties
Line of Credit for purchase
50,000,000
7,850,000
50,000,000
15.70%
70.00%
140,000,000
78,000,000
* These fees will be paid by a loan to be repaid at Sale after investors capital
has been returned. Monthly interest payments will be paid to GP affiliate for
arranging and servicing loan.
1 Because of the loan for front-end fees, all of the capital raised is considered to
go for purchasing properties.
e* The partnership is hoping to leverage 702 loan to value. Up to 801 of the
total purchase price of all partnership properties on a combined basis can be
leveraged.
(a) Line of credit can be used to leverage chosen properties.
(b) SP receives fees for acquisition, construction contracts, brokerage, leasing, etc.
It is unclear whether these are double fees.
PARTNERSHIP OBJECTIVES
1. Preserve and protect the investors' original capital contribution.
2. Provide capital appreciation through increases in value of partnership's
real estate assets.
3. Provide current cash flow for distribution to investors on a quarterly basis,
a portion of which will not constitute taxable income.
4. Increase cash distributions over the life of the partnership.
SPLITS
Taxable Income
Cash Flow 5guaranteed return the first year (early investors receive incentive
return) to investors, after SP receives fee cf .5' of gross asset value
of all properties. Then 1001 of all cash flow to investors.
Sale Proceeds Investor capital contribution returned , ther 61 cuauLative non-compoun
return to investors after repays front-end fees loans. Finr.aly, 80
of remaining proceeds to investors; 20" to Fo.
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Regan M. Dobroth
GLACIER VIEW (leveraged) EXHIBIT 7 A and 7 B Megan M. Dobroth
BREAKDOWN OF SYNDICATOR'S UPFRONT FEES
% Fees/ Capital Raised 15.70%
% Cossission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees **
% Organizational Fees/ Total Upfront Fees **
** Unknown
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EXHIBIT 8 A and 8 B Regan M. Dobroth
Project Name:
Based upon:
Offering Date:
Type:
Holding Period:
GLACIER VIEW (unleveraged)
POST- TRA '86
JANUARY 13, 1987
UNKNOWN (50% of commercial property)
5 to 10 YEARS
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:
Equity Raised for property:
% Fees/ Capital Raised
I Leverage
Total anticipated asset value of properties
25,000,000
4,500,000
20,500,000
1B.00%
0.00%
20,000,000
(a) 6P receives fees for acquisition, construction contracts, brokerage, leasing, etc.
It is unclear whether these are double fees.
PARTNERSHIP OBJECTIVES
1. Preserve and protect the investors' original capital contribution.
2. Provide capital appreciation through increases in value of partnership's
real estate assets.
3. Provide current cash flow for distribution to investors on a quarterly basis,
a portion of which will not constitute taxable income.
SPLITS
Taxable Income ++
Cash FlOW A miniaum of 7.5% per annum non-cospounding casulative return, paid quarterly. Early investors
receive an additional 12 cash flow the first year. After annual fee based on 0.5% of the net asset v
of all partnership properties is paid to GP, investors get 100% of Temaining cash flow.
Sale Proceeds Investors recieve capital contribution back , then 85 of remaining proceeds. If 5% is
nat enough to give investors 125% of their capital return, then GP will forfeit
their share until goal is reached.
+ Losses carriet forward to sale.
+ Annual acquisition fees if not paid because of cash flow shortfall far investors'
priority rEturn, ther partnership pays 8.5% interest until paid out of excess
cash flow or sale proceeds.
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BREAKDOWN OF SYND)ICATDR'S UPFRONT FEES
Fees/Capital Raised 18.00
Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees 44.44%
Organizational Fees! Total Upfront Fees 22.22
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GLACIER VIEW (unleveraged)
TANGLE FALLS EXHIBIT 9 A and 9 B
Project Name: TANGLE FALLS (unleveraged)
Based upon: POST- TRA '86
Offering Date: JANUARY 13, 1987
Type: COMMERCIAL
Holding Period: 5 TO 10 YEARS
Capital Raised through Syndication: 250,000,000
Syndicator's Fees: 34,625,000
Equity Raised for real estate 150,762,500
Equity Raised for securities 64,612,500
Z Fees/ Capital Raised 13.25%
% Leverage 0.00%
Total anticipated asset value of properties 150,762,500
(a) 6P receives fees for acquisition, construction contracts, brokerage, leasing, etc.
It is unclear whether these are double fees.
PARTNERSHIP OBJECTIVES
1. Preserve and protect the investors' original capital contribution by investing in
unleveraged properties and by acquiring MBS.
2. Provide capital appreciation through increases in value of partnership's
real estate assets.
. Provide current cash flow for distribution to investors on a quarterly basis,
a portion of which will besheltered.
4. Diversify the partnership investments to reduce its investment risk.
5. Provide a possible hedge against disinflation in expectation that the partnership interest in MBS could be
sold at a gain in the event of a general decline in interest rates.
6. Provide a balanced conservative structure which, through the inclusion of cash flow
generated by MBS., renders the occupancy level needed by the partnership's properties
for break-even below that generally requuired of leveraged or wileveraged properties,
and thereby decrease overall portfolio risk.
SPLITS
Taxable Income ++
Cash Flow 5.5% non-cumulative annual return on investment, then the EP will get 5%
of thE cashflow, then investors additional cast flow to saie total
up to 932 of the cash flow. GP get remaining 2% of cash flow if not need to give investors 6.5% return.
in 1991 6. non-cumulative annua return on investment, then thE 6p will get 5%
of tne cashflob, ther investors additional cash flow to make total
ur to 9.: of the cash flow. Then, 6P gets 7% of cash fiow, ther, investors get
cas. to up return to r., then GP gets, if any, 23 of the remaining cash flow.
Sale Proceeds First investors get capital contribution back, then gp get invested capital back,
then investors get enough net proceeds to give 121 per annum for all fiscal years,
the remaining cash gives investors enough to have 902 of cash flow, GP gets, if any, remaining
10% of the cash flow.
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Megan M. Dobroth
TANGLE FALLS EXHIBIT 9 A and 9 B (continued) Megan M. Dobroth
BREAKDOWN OF SYNDICATOR'S FEES
i Fees/ Capital Raised 13.85%
X Commission Fees/ Total Upfront Fees 57.761
1 Organizational Fees/ Total Upfront Fees 21.66%
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BIRCH BLUFF EXHIBIT 10 A and 10 B
Project Name:
Based upon:
Offering Date:
Type:
Holding Period:
Capital Raised through Syndication:
Syndicator's Fees:
Equity Raised for property:*#
% Fees/ Capital Raised
BIRCH BLUFF
POST- TRA '86
APRIL 7, 1987
LOW INCOME HOUSING blind pool
15 YEARS
1,470,000
515,000
955,000
35.03%
** Remaining amount is legal fees and expenses for setting up syndication.
(a) GP plans to get a mortgage from FmHA
(b) GP plan to get an interim loan for seven years to cover investor's pay-in period.
(C) GP will receive any advantage from alower than plnned interest rate for interim loan.
(d) 6P receives accrued interest on any acquision or development costs they incurred.
The interest and prinicpal is due at sale or refinancing prior to distribution of proceeds to any partners.
(e) If GP loan the project monies for shortfalls, the sum plus accrued interest is due at sale or refinancing.
SPLITS INVESTORS GENERAL PARTNER
Taxable Income 941 61
Cash Flow 941 6%
Sale Proceeds Capital back based on 50.5% of any remaining proceeds
$42,000 unit size, then after Investor Limited Partner
49.51 of remaining proceeds.receive capital back
BREAKDOWN OF SYNDICATOR'S FEES
I Fees/ Capital Raised 35.03%
I Comission Fees/ Total Upfront fees 22.63%
7 Organiational Fees/ Total Upfront Fees 23.18%
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Megan M. Dobroth
BIRCH BLUFF EXHIBIT 10 C
INVESTOR BENEFIT SCHEDULE
INSTALLMENT METHOD
LOW INCOME SHELTERED CUMULATIVE
CAPITAL HOUSING DISTRIBUTABLE TOTAL PASSIVE
YEAR CONTRIBUTION TAX CREDIT CASH FLOW BENEFIT TAX LOSSES
1987
1928
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
TOTAL
3,500
6,600
6,800
6,800
6,800
6,800
4,500
3, 650
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
3,350
42,000 70,000
Distributable Cash Sale Proceeds
Income Taxes Due t 28%
Net Sale Cash Benefit
Cumulative Low IncomE Tax Credits
Projected Cash Distributions
Total Cash Net After-Tax Return
Less: Driginal investmente
Net 'as. Benefit
Deferred Losses Avilatile or, Sale
Internal Rate of Return
Modified Rate of Return (8 reinvesta
Net Present Value E". discount ratel
Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Return
0
50
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
1,450
3,650 (2,500)
7,050 (7,500)
7,100 (12,500)
7,100 (17,500)
7,100 (22,500)
7,100 (27,500)
7,100 (32,500)
7,100 (37,500)
7,100 (42,500)
7,100 (47,500)
3,450 (52,500)
100 (57,500)
100 (62,500)
100 (67,500)
100 (72,500)
100 (77,500)
71,450 (77,500)
$1 Over
Mortgage Investor
(Foreciosure) Capital
0 42,000
0 (406)
0 41,594
70,000 70,000
1,450 1,450
71,450 113,044
(42,000) (42,000)
29,450
41,500
50.56%
!3,668
97.97.
71,044
51.8%
25.0%
25,908
61.92%
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Megan M. Dobroth
EXHIBIT 11 Megan M. Dobroth
PRE-TAX REFORM '86 * (Assumes a 501 marginal tax bracket)
PURCHASE PRICE 10,000,000
MORTGAGE AMOUNT 8,000,000
INTEREST RATE 10.001
TERM 30
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE) 19
HOLDING PERIOD 7
SALES PRICE 12,000,000
CASH FLOW 1 2 3 4 5 6
NET OPERATING COME
LESS: ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE
CASH FLOW BEFORE TAXES
TAXABLE INCOME
NET OPERATING COME
LESS: INTEREST
LESS: DEPRECIATION
REAL ESTATE TAXABLE INCOME
850,000 850,000 890,000 995,000 900,000 901,000
(848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (84E,633) (848,633)
1,367 1,367 41,367 46,367 51,367 52,367
850,000 950,000 890,000 895,000 900,000 901,000
(800,000) (795,136) (789,786) (783,902) (777,428) (770,308)
(421,053) (421053) (42453) (424053) (421,053) (424053)
(371,053) (366,189) (320,939) (309,955) (298,491) (290,361)
ADJUSTED BASIS
ORIGINAL BASIS
LESS:DEPRECIATION
ADJUSTED BASIS
10,000,000
(2,947,368)
7,052,632
CALCULATION (I GAIN
SAES PRICE
LEES: AUSTED BASIS
GAIN
AMOUNT OF GAIN TAXED (401)
TAX LIABILITY ON SALE *
SALE PROCEEDS
SALES PRICE
LESS: MDRTGAE
LESS: TAX LIALLTY ON SALE*
PRZCEEDS ATTEr TAXE:
12,000,000
(7,533,601)
(989,474)
3,426,925
110
12,000,000
(7,052,632)
4,947,369
1,978,947
929,474
Megan M. Dobroth
PRE-TAX REFORM
BENEFIT STREAM
ANNUAL
TAXABLE TAX NET AFTER-TAX
INCOME BENEFIT DISTRIBUT CURRENT
YEAR (LOSS) (COST) CASH FLOW RETURN
1 (371,053) 185,526 1,367 186,893
2 (366,189) 183,094 1,367 184,461
3 (320,839) 160,419 41,367 201,786
4 (309,955) 154,977 46,367 201,344
5 (298,481) 149,240 51,367 200,607
6 (290,361) 145,180 52,367 197,547
7 (278,528) 139,264 56,367 3,622,556
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 15.971
MODIFIED RATE OF RETURN 14.521
(8 reinvestient rate)
NET PRESENT VALUE 938,999
Z Tax Benefits/Entire Retur 23.311
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EXHIBIT 11 B
Megan M. Dobroth
POST TAX REFORM '86 EXAMPLE (Assuaes a 28% tax rate and all passive losses are carried forvard to saie.)
PURCHASE PRICE 10,000,000
MORTGAGE AMOUNT 8,000,000
INTEREST RATE 10.00%
TERM 30
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE) 31.5
HOLDING PERIOD 7
SALES PRICE 12,000,000
CASH FLOW 1 2 3 4 5 6
NET OPERATING INCOME 850,000 850,000 890,000 895,000 900,000 901,000 905,C
LESS: ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (848,633) (84E,E
CASH FLOW BEFORE TAXES 1,367 1,367 41,367 46,367 51,367 52,367 56,i
TAXABLE INCOME
NET OPERATING INCOME 850,000 850,000 890,000 895,000 900,000 901,000 905,(
LESS. INTEREST (800,000) (795,136) (789,786) (783,902) (777,428) (770,308) (762,4
LESS: DEPRECIATION (251,968) (23,968) (253,968) 1253,968) t253,968) (253,968J (25 ,
REAL ESTATE TAXABLE INCOME (203,968) (199,104) (153,754) (142,870) (131,396) (123,2763 (1::,
(Now defi-ned as passive incose(losses))
ADJUSTED BASIS
ORIGINAL BASIS 10,000,000 CALCULATION C TAX LIABLITY ON SALE
L5SS:DEPRECIATION (1,777,778) - -- -- -- --------
----- SALES PRICE 12,000,000
ADJUSTED BASIS 8,222,222 ADJUSTED BASIS (8,222,222)
GAIN 3,777,778
PASSTVE LIESES (1,065,213)
SALE PFRCEErE TAXABLE GAIN 2,711,9E5
TAXES DuE (328 759,350
SAES P!E 1Z,00
LEES: MT6ASE C, ,6
* T.A; ON~:2' Si-* c.1
PROCEEDS A'TER TAXES ,702,049
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EXHIBIT 12 A
Megan M. Dobroth
POST-TAX REFORM
BENEFIT STREAM
ANNUAL
NET AFTER-TAX
DISTRIBUTABLE CURRENT
YEAR CASH FLOW RETURN
1 1,367 1,367
2 1,367 1,367
3 41,367 41,367
4 46,367 46,367
5 51,367 51,367
6 52,367 52,367
7 56,367 3,75B,416
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 10.441
MODIFIED RATE OF RETURN 10.381
(81 reinvestient rate)
NET PRESENT VALUE 305,849
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EXHIBIT 12 B
Megan M. Dobroth
EFFECT OF LEVERAGE ON POST TAX REFORM '(Assumes a 28Z tax rate
LEVERAGED
PURCHASE PRICE
MORTGAGE MOUNT
INTEREST RATE
(Interest only)
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE)
HOLDING PERIOD
SALES PRICE
ADJUSTED BASIS
ORIGINAL BASIS
LESS:DEPRECIATION
ADJUSTED BASIS
CALCULATION OF TAX LIABILITY ON SALE
SALES PRICE
ADJUSTED BASIS
GAIN
PASSIVE LOSSES
TAXABLE GAIN
TAXES DUE (282)
SALE PROCEEDS
SALES PRICE
LESS: MORTGAGE
LESS: TAX LIABILITY ON SALE#
PROCEEDS AFTER TAXES
10,000,000
8,000,000
10.00%
31.5
7
16,000,000
10,000,000
(1,777,778)
8,222,222
16,000,000
(8, 222,222)
7,777,778
0
7,777,778
2,177,778
16,000,000
(8,000,000)
(2,177,778)
5,822,222
UNLEVERAGED
PURCHASE PRICE
MORTGAGE MOUNT
INTEREST RATE
TERM
DEPRECIATION (STRAIGHT LINE)
HOLDING PERIOD
SALES PRICE
ADJUSTED BASIS
ORIGINAL BASIS
LESS:DEPRECIATION
ADJUSTED BASIS
CALCULAT1ON OF TAX LIABILITY ON SALE
SALES PRICE
ADJUSTED SASIS
GAIN
PASSIVE LOSSES
TAXABLE GAIN
TAXES DUE (29Z)
SALE PROCEEDS
SALES PRICE
LESS: MORTGAGE
LESS: TAX LIABILITY ON SALE*
PROCEEDS ATTER TAES
YEAR
1 (:,00c,000)
20
32 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 5,622,222
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
YEAP
I (10,000,000)
20
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 13,822,222
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN19.49%
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10,000,000
0
31.5
7
16,000,000
10,000,000
(1,777,778)
6,222,222
16,000,000(a,222,222
7,777,778
0
7,777,77B
2,177,778
1.,000,000
0
(2,177,778)
13,822,222
5.54%
------- -----
EXHIBIT 13
Megan M. Dobroth
TABLE OF COMPARISON OF ALL SYNDICATION'S COMPONENTS
**PRE-TRA '86** ********POST- TRA'86******************
----------------- 
----------------------------------------------------
GLACIER GLACIER
ROLLING STONY OAK OCEAN VIEW VIEW TANGLE
GREENS BROOK PARK CREST (unlever)(lever) FALLS
---------------- 
--------------------------------- 
----- - --- -------
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
---------------------------------------------------------------
1 Fees/ Capital Raised 20.241 26.701 23.29% 23.151 18.00% 15.701 13.85%
Z Commission/ Upfront Fees 49.42% 0.001 42.941 39.881 44.44% *** 57.761
% Organizational cost/ Upfront Fees 11.631 49.211 14.261 13.571 22.22% *** 21.66%
Any remaining portion of operating reserve yes yes no yes ** *** ***
Any remaining portion of working reserve yes no no yes *** H** f**
Any benefit from change in loan terms yes no no yes *** *** ***
Annual fee for servicing partnership no no yes yes *** *** ***
Double fee for providing certain services no no yes yes yes yes yes
I MBS/ Total Investment 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 30.001
SPLITS (Investor: Syndicator)
Taxable Income 98:02 98:02 ** ** ** ** **
Cash Flow 99:02 98:02 98:02 97:03 100:0+ 100:0+ 93:07+
Sales Proceeds (See iiiviual exhibits.)
LEVERAGED AMOUNT
% Leveraged 64.86 72.111 67.22% 44.59% 0.00 70.00% 0.00
I Leveraged with adjustaent for foes 69.75% 77.44 72.77% 51.15% 0.00% *** 0.001
I Leveraged with adjustment for fees 69.75% 77.441 72.77% 93.57% 0.00 *** 0.00%
and interim loan
RATES OF RETURN (Installment Method)
Internal Rate of Return 26.00% 26.30% 22.101 18.10% ++ ++ ++
Modified Rate of Return* 19.70% 22.90% 25.40% 14.40% ++ ++ ++
% Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Benefits 55.791 90.77% -2.23% 0.00% ++ ++ ++
RATES OF RETURN (Cast Method)
Internal Rate of Return ++ ++ 1S.10: 12.90% *** *** ***
Modified Rate of Return*+ ++ 16.80% 11.90% *** *** **
I Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Benefits + ++ -2.23% 0.001 *** *** +**
GUARANTEED CURRENT YIELD ++ ++ ++ ++ 7.50% 5.00% 6.501
* Reinvestment rate of 8r.
+* Passive losses carried forward to sale.
*** Unknown.
+ After certain returns and certain fees are paid.
++ Not Applicable.
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EXHIBIT 14
Megan K. Dobroth
TABLE OF COMPARISON OF ALL SYNDICATION'S COMPONENTS LOW INCOME HOUSING
**PRE-TRA '86** *POST- TRA'86*
PALM REDWOOD BIRCH
COURT FOREST BLUFF
SYNDICATOR'S FEES
% Fees/ Capital Raised 43.64% 22.39% 35.03%
% Commission/ Upfront Fees 25.16% *** 22.83%
I Organizational cost/ Upfront Fees 50.22% *** 23.18.
Any retaining portion of operating reserve no no no
Any remaining portion of working reserve no no no
Any benefit from change in loan terms no no yes
Annual fee for servicing partnership yes yes no
Double fee for providing certain services yes yes yes
SPLITS (Investor: Syndicator)
Taxable Income (90.5):(9.5) (92.5):(1.5) 94:06
Cash Flow (90.5):(9.5) (98.5):(1.5) 94:06
Sales Proceeds (See individual exhibits.)
LEVERASED AEDUNT
I Leveraged 62.87% 61.2% *. *
Z Leveraged with adjustment for fees 75.931 64.98% +++
RATES OF RETURN (Installment Method)
Internal Rate of Return 42.001 43.50% 31.80%
Modified Rate of Return- 15.401 20.701 25.00%
, Tax Benefit/ Total Investor Benefits 85.92 97.19 61.92i
* Reinvestment rate of S.
++* Unknown.
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EXHIBIT 15
